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ABSTRACT

The issue addressed in this paper is the relationship between form in fictional prose and form in other uses of language, particularly those uses important in composition theory. Form in composition theory has traditionally had two ways of identifying units of analysis: (1) the sentence and semantic units, and (2) pragmatic and rhetorical units. The focus of the paper is on pragmatics and rhetoric. The paper argues that fictional narratives have the underlying form of different types of ordinary speech events and that an understanding of this form helps explain some of the problems young readers sometimes have and some of the critical problems posed by literary critics. Distancing, processing, and modeling are examined, with emphases on the distancing dimension, the processing characteristics, and the modeling characteristics of speech events. Three types of speech events are considered: conversational, report story, and prototype exposition (one type of formal history). The misreading of stories is discussed, with special attention given to: assimilation or the following of rules; the misreading of fact without context; misreading the narrator as unchanging; misreading distance, choice, and boredom; and accommodation, or the modification of rules. (HOD)

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Fictional Narrative as Speech Event

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I. INTRODUCTION

Theories of composition and theories of literature sometimes exhibit an interesting compatibility. Wayne Booth's (1961) introduction of the "implied author" to literary criticism, for example, parallels Chaim Perelman's introduction of the "implied audience" to rhetoric (Hirsch, 1977:27). But one of the persistent problems in investigating areas of compatibility between composition and literary criticism is the fact that theories of composition have focused almost exclusively on the writing of prose and theories of literature have until the last fifteen years treated poetry as the literary norm.

The issue to be addressed in this paper is the relationship between form in fictional prose and form in other uses of language, particularly those uses important in composition theory. Form in composition theory has traditionally had two ways of identifying units of analysis: (1) the sentence and semantic units (paragraphs, for instance); and, (2) pragmatic and rhetorical units. The focus of this paper will be on the second, pragmatics and rhetoric. The argument will be that fictional narratives have the underlying form of different types of ordinary speech events and that an understanding of this

form helps explain some of the problems which young readers sometimes have and some of the critical problems posed by literary critics.

The discussion among literary critics of the form of prose fiction has left many students of the subject dissatisfied. The source of this dissatisfaction has been the claim that some critics treat prose fiction like poetry, as a verbal construct, and ignore the way prose fiction imitates life, while other critics treat prose fiction as an imitation of life and ignore the claims that fiction is a verbal construct. Over thirty years ago, Mark Schorer (1948) observed that technique in poetry was treated as a "means of exploring and defining value in an area of experience" but that technique in fiction was treated as "merely a means of organizing material." Almost twenty years later, David Lodge found that the study of fiction still lagged behind the study of poetry. Lodge, while granting that the crux of the problem was "the relation of literary language to reality" (1966:18), proposed treating prose fiction as if it were a poem--in other words, a verbal construct (1966:73).

Malcolm Bradbury has found Lodge's approach unsatisfactory because it assumes that with respect to prose forms critics must "apply the same kind of stylistic analysis to them as we have to poetry" (1977:4). Bradbury also finds the approach of Ian Watt "equally misleading" because of

its emphasis on "the referential quality of fiction" (1977:5). Kettle (1962) and Lodge (1977), like Bradbury, point to the opposing tendencies in prose fiction of "life" and "pattern," and Spilka (1977) believes that the distinction between "life" and "pattern" in Lodge and Kettle is comparable to Barbara Hardy's (1977) distinction between truth telling and dreams. Finally, Reed (1977) argues that there is a basic incompatibility between poetics and the novel and raises the question of whether a poetics of fictional prose is even possible.

To investigate the poetics of fictional prose, Reed suggests an approach in which the novel comes to terms with the "alien order of poetics" through a realist strategy of rejection:

> . . . the novel asserts its place not within the literary universe but within the "real" world of non-literary discourse. Form and function are not ostensibly conditioned by literary priorities, as they were in Paradise Lost, Pope's Pastorals, or in a subtler way, Wordsworth's lyrics; they are dictated by the types of persons and places involved. (1977:70)

Bradbury's approach to the problem is the construction of "a more inclusive typology" which concentrates on "those characteristics which create an effect of verbal unity" and on "those which make for lifelikeness" (1977:6). What combines "lifelikeness" and "verbal unity"? Bradbury suggests examining writer-reader relationships:

> It also means that, while we regard novels as verbal constructs, we must see the nature of what

> is constructed not as a self sustaining entity but as a species of persuasion, the writer handling material for the reader so as to engage him properly with the world of this single work. (1977:6)

In other words, the essential form of fictional prose can be found in the forms suggested by rhetoric and pragmatics.

Booth, like Reed and Bradbury, sees the relationship between prose fiction and nonliterary discourse or "life-likeness" as a necessary part of understanding fictional form. Commenting on how he might change his Rhetoric of Fiction, Booth says,

> In theory, once I had grasped my subject as the rhetorical aspect of fiction I should have written "the whole rhetoric of fiction." Such a work would have been different in many ways. . . . It would have had much more on style. . . . It might well have had a comparison of the rhetoric of literature, in this conception, with more directly rhetorical forms. (1977:86)

But how can forms of prose fiction be compared to nonliterary discourse or the rhetorical forms of everyday speech situations? The poetics of prose fiction does not, at this time, offer a well enough developed theory for useful investigation. However, there is a sociolinguistic theory of everyday speech situations which could be applied to fictional prose.

The systematic analysis of everyday language situations has been neglected in the past by social scientists, but in recent years there has emerged a body of sociolinguistic research on everyday language situations and a shared view of what characteristics can be used to define

a speech event. In the argument that follows, these characteristics of everyday speech situations will be described and then clustered into three different types of speech events, each type identified by a fictional prototype.

First, what are the characteristics of everyday speech events? Jakobson (1960) has identified six:

	CONTEXT	
ADDRESSER	MESSAGE	ADDRESSEE
	CONTACT	
	CODE	

Jakobson (1960:357) has also identified the six functions or dimensions of a speech event:

	REFERENTIAL	
EMOTIVE	POETIC	CONATIVE
	PHATIC	
	METALINGUAL	

The students of the everyday speech events have agreed that there are three major characteristics and have largely agreed what the names of the characteristics will be. As Fraser (1978) has indicated, the first three major characteristics of Hymes' (1972) speaking mnemonic are setting, participants, and ends. Brown and Fraser (1979) propose three concepts--settings, participants, purpose--and these more than encompass Fishman's assertion that "a situation is defined by the occurrence of two (or more) interlocutors related to each other in a particular way, communicating

about a particular topic, in a particular setting" (1972: 48). Finally, Halliday (1978), like the others, divides the speech situation into the field of discourse (subject matter), the tenor of discourse (relationships among the participants), and the mode or channel of communication (telephone, newscast, radio lecture, and so forth).

In summary, Jakobson and other speech event theorists propose three basic dimensions governing the meaning of language in a speech event. First, the two participants in a speech event are the addresser and the addressee and the fundamental question about their relationship is the distancing between them. Do the participants have a close relationship (conative and emotive) or an impersonal relationship? Second, the two purposes in a speech event are to emphasize code (language) or context (referent) and the fundamental question about these two purposes is their processing of our knowledge of the world. Do they project a world which is approximate and uncertain or one which is definite and analyzable? The former is metalingual processing, emphasizing the uncertainty of the language in casual estimates of what the realities of the world might be. The latter is referential processing, emphasizing the denotations of the language in a rather difficult analysis of the definitive realities of the world. Third, the two settings or channels in a speech event are contact and message and the fundamental question about them is their

modeling of text. If the participants in the speech event believe that they are modeling contact, not message, they will emphasize the phatic functions of language, talking for the sake of talking, prolonging communication. If the participants are modeling message, not contact, they will emphasize the poetic functions of language, creating a message for its own sake, a decontextualized verbal form. The phatic functions signal that the setting or channel is transitory. The poetic functions assume that the setting or channel is permanent.

Each of these three dimensions of a speech situation--distancing, processing, and modeling--is signalled by a set of words. The word as a signal of speech event form may be either invariant or probabilistic (Brown and Fraser, 1979:37). An invariant occurrence would be one in which the presence of the linguistic item is perfectly correlated with the presence of the social category in the speech situation. Probabilistic markers are those with a high probability of marking a given characteristic. As Brown and Fraser have noted, the majority of markers are probabilistic (1979:37). A number of studies have identified markers of distancing between the addresser and the addressee, from close (me, my, mine, I, you, our, us) to far (editorial we); markers of subject matter processing, from approximations (sorta, kinda, about, lots, really, plenty) to definitions (in general, in essence, basically,

for the most part), from approximate connections (and, so, but, then) to embedded relationships (if, which, because, who, although, while, when); and markers of channels or modeling, either the impermanence of the text (suppose, can't be sure, ain't no matter, ellipsis, CAPS, (), !, and other idiomatic and informal markers) or the permanence of the text (titles, paragraphing, marked conclusion, formal language).

In summary, speech events have three dimensions with contrasting features signalled in particular words:

Distancing:

Participants:	Addresser ----------	Addressee
Dimension:	emotive	impersonal
Projected Relationship:	close	far
Words:	I/you	it/a person

Processing:

Purpose:	Code ----------	Context
Dimension:	metalingual	referential
Projected World:	approximate	normative and embedded
Words:	sorta/kinda	in general, although

Modeling:

Setting or Channel:	Contact ----------	Message
Dimension:	phatic	poetic
Projected Channel:	temporary	permanent
Words:	()#, !, slang	titles, marked conclusion

Before we examine how dimensions of speech situations occur in fictional prose, we need to review two problems much discussed in literary theory--first, the problem of whether fiction can be considered an act of communication or rhetoric and, second, the problem of when language is and is not signal. The speech event analysis proposed here assumes that fiction is an act of communication and that words can signal dimensions of distancing, processing, and modeling.

Objections to communication theory as a basis for describing fictional style have been proposed by Hamburger (1973), Kuroda (1973, 1976), and Banfield (1973). Hamburger has argued that in some instances the intention of the author is not communication to someone else but creation of something: "not that of 'expressing himself' (Hegel) but that of 'bringing to givenness' (to express Husserl's terms)" (Hamburger, 1973:236). Similarly, Kuroda argues that in narrative the essence of linguistic performance consists not in sending meaning to someone else but in "meaning assigning acts . . . and meaning-fulfilling acts' for oneself (Kuroda, 1976:126). Kuroda also has argued that there exists in Japanese a literary style which "transcends the paradigm of linguistic performance in terms of speaker and hearer," thereby suggesting that the relation of narrator to reader is not a basic relationship underlying all narrative structures. Banfield (1973)

presents a similar argument, using evidence from direct and indirect speech to show that the direct style, with an obvious narrator, has a syntax which the indirect style cannot have. She finds that the hypothesis of the effaced narrator blurs the divisions between drama and narrative and the epistemological division between reporting, which implies a speaker and addressee, and expressing, which does not.

Booth tries to answer similar objections in his rhetorical approach to fiction by arguing that fiction is not communicating "themes or norms, as Mr. Donald Pitzer and many other readers have taken it, but itself" (1977: 85). Booth's position is the one that will be assumed here. The point is that people in their everyday lives often encounter effaced narrators--newspapers and textbooks, for instance--and most people find that it is more functional to assume an implied voice or persona than not to. One of the things textbooks and newspapers communicate is a relationship between some kind of reader and some kind of speaker. The advantages of this assumption will become more apparent when the theory is applied to reading problems.

The argument in this paper will assume, therefore, that there is always an implied author who has a speech event role which is either different from the narrator's or the same as the narrator's. What are these roles?

Chatman, in an interesting review of two implied authors, says that in the transcription of speech--a conversation, for example--the author is presumed to be "nothing more than a stenographer," but in narrative imitating already written documents--like letters or journals--the implied author is "a mere collector of documents." Chatman describes what he calls the Jamesian effect or impersonal narrator, but stops short of identifying the implied author, referring only to "a mediated 'central consciousness' or 'post of observation'--a topic for a later stage of inquiry" (1975:257).

The implied author, therefore, might play a number of different roles:

Narrator	Implied Author
Writer of diary	Collector of documents
Conversational story teller	Recorder of monologue
Reporter of third-person account of event	Same as narrator (plays role of narrator)
Explainer of events, sometimes inside minds of characters	Same as narrator, a distant and omniscient authority

The second issue is the degree to which language is or is not a signal of meaning. Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) have argued that there are two kinds of meaning in a speech act--the literal references of words (propositional content) and the social or rhetorical meanings of

words (illocutionary force). For instance, the difference between "Can you empty the garbage?" and "Empty the goddam garbage" is the rhetorical difference between a polite request and an abusive command. What the speaker intends as reference--the removal of the garbage--is the same in both cases. The focus of this paper is on rhetorical social meanings. But the question is how many occurrences of a given word or phrase are necessary in order for readers to know that the language is a signal of a given dimension of distancing, processing, or modeling. A single occurrence of you seems to establish a close distancing, but more than one sorta may be necessary to establish that the processing is approximate. Rene Wellek, for one, has objected to a heavy reliance on frequency counts:

> I recognize that psychologists consider their task as that of quantification, that they believe nothing to be ascertained and verified before it has been reduced to some quantitative ratio. I, as every humanist must, argue that this is a false epistemology based on the superstition of behaviorism. It denies the evidence of introspection and empathy, the two sources of human and humane knowledge. (1960:409)

What Wellek argues for in style studies is "intuition" and "the circle of understanding":

> In reading with a sense of continuity, for contextual coherence, for wholeness, there comes a moment when we feel that we have "understood," that we have seized on the right interpretation, the real meaning. The psychologists might say that this is a mere hunch, a mere intuition. But it is the source of knowledge in all humanistic branches of learning. . . . It is a process called the "circle of understanding." It

> proceeds from attention to detail and an anticipation of the whole and back again to an interpretation of the detail. (1960:419)

The argument presented here will use Wellek's approach primarily, but some frequencies will be used as "rough indications" (Ullmann, 1965:22). The purpose of the frequency counts will be not to reduce a work to a structural detail but to provide some support for the claims made about a given piece of fictional discourse. Some of the language presented as evidence of a particular speech event will include devices which receive little attention in style studies, devices such as "uh," "yeah," "sorta," and so forth. In summary, the argument presented here will focus on three primary dimensions of rhetorical situations, using various words and phrases as markers of the dimensions. The main point of the argument is that understanding the rhetorical situations underlying fictional narrative will illuminate the problems that young readers have with some stories.

II. DISTANCING, PROCESSING, MODELING

This chapter will review the research identifying different degrees of distancing, processing, and modeling in speech events and present examples of these features in fictional prose.

The Distancing Dimension

The notion of different degrees of distancing comes from the work of Grice, Searle, Robin Lakoff, and Pratt. Grice (1975), in an effort to show that there is a logic in natural languages, suggests that a cooperative principle exists among speakers and listeners in natural language situations. Following this principle, the reader/listener will assume that the writer is trying to be informative, as required by the maxim of quantity, to be truthful (maxim of quality), to be relevant (maxim of relations), and to be clear (maxim of manner). In addition, the reader will assume that the writer is not trying to multiply the senses or meaning of a word beyond necessity (Searle, 1975). The writer, of course, will assume that the reader is being cooperative and giving encouragement to the writer's efforts.

Furthermore, the writer knows that the reader will invoke conversational implicature to guarantee that the

maxims are being followed. That is, the reader will provide whatever assumptions are necessary to connect material so that information is relevant, truthful, and so forth. The writer knows that if he flouts a maxim, the reader will invoke conversational implicature so that maxims are adhered to. In this way ironical statements, which flout the maxims of truthfulness, can, through conversational implicature, be assumed to mean the opposite of what is said. In friendly situations, the writer, of course, knows that he has a responsibility to flout truthfulness in an obvious enough manner so that the reader understands that irony is intended. The cooperative principle is most often in effect when the relationship between writer and reader is personal, reflecting the reciprocity, spontaneity, and empathy found in dyadic conversation (R. Lakoff, 1981a).

The cooperative principle is suspended when the reader and writer (speaker and listener) are sharing unidiomatic language. Searle points to the fact that people rarely say "Is it the case that you at present have the ability to reach that book on the top shelf" and concludes:

> Besides the maxims proposed by Grice, there seems to be an additional maxim of conversation that could be expressed as follows: Speak idiomatically unless there is some specific reason not to. For this reason, the normal conversational assumptions on which the possibility of indirect speech acts rests are in large part suspended in the non-idiomatic cases. (1975a:76-77)

Pratt (1977) has called the suspension of the cooperative principle "putting oneself in verbal jeopardy." In the

non-idiomatic cases, then, the uncooperative principle is invoked. The principle is usually stated in some form in most handbooks on writing. For instance, one says that the writer assumes "that the burden of communication falls mainly upon him" and demands "as little of the reader as is consistent with his own intentions" (Brandt, Beloof, Nathan, and Selph, 1969). Another book describes the problem as a search for common ground. It is:

> assumed that reasonable men of differing interests, experience, and vocabulary will disagree about some questions to which reason, nevertheless, must apply. Consequently, they not only can but must, by virtue of their common problems, search for the meeting places where they can stand together and explore their differences about the choices life presents. (Booth, 1974)

In general, then, the readers of formal Western exposition, not Asian, are expected to be critics who identify the differences between their views and the author's, and the writers of formal written exposition are expected to assume the burden of communication and expect little support from the reader. Grice's maxims, therefore, are the responsibilities of writers of exposition, not speakers of conversation. Robin Lakoff (1977:225) argues that, if conversational speakers were required to follow Grice's maxims, the conversation "would be unbearable to engage in." However, the second part of Grice's argument, the implicatures which listeners must invoke in a conversation, is an accurate reflection of the rules of conversation. The readers of conversational prose are expected to

be cooperative, not critical, and to regard the development of views in a conversation to be a responsibility shared by readers and writers. Readers, therefore, invoke various types of implications in order to make sense of whatever is said. Writers of conversational prose, unlike writers of exposition, expect much help from the reader and make an effort to involve the reader in the development of ideas.

Cooperative distancing is the dominant form when the underlying speech event for a piece of writing is a friendly conversation between equals, and uncooperative distancing is the dominant form in an intellectual exposition between members of a discipline. Lakoff argues that conversations are rarely a case of one thing or another, but usually invoke several different types of rules, depending on the occasion. Three rules which she finds in conversations are the following (Lakoff, 1977:214-221):

Rule 1: Formality: Don't impose; remain aloof. Says Lakoff:

> Rule 1 is followed when the speaker maintains distance from the addressee, does not ask about personal affairs . . . does not use particles like "you know," "I guess," "Well" . . .

Rule 3: Hesitancy; allow the addressor his options. Says Lakoff:

> We find many linguistic manifestations of hesitancy, some expressing genuine uncertainty (that is, not used as politeness devices at all); some used as true politeness devices (the speaker knows what he wants, but sincerely does not wish to force the addressee into a decision); and some used as conventional politeness (the speaker

knows what he wants, knows he has a right to expect it from the addressee, and the addressee knows it too).

Rule 3: Equality or Camaraderie: Act as though you and the addressee were equal; make him feel good.

The argument proposed here is that the rule of camaraderie is typical of most conversations between equals, and the rule of formality is typical of expository exchanges. The hesitancy rule, one that Lakoff finds to be common in women's conversations, occurs in two situations. First, it occurs in conversations with informal markers like sorta, kinda, and pretty much, suggesting approximations and a hesitancy to be definite. It also occurs in exposition and newspaper reports to avoid or temper speculation about ideas or generalities. The hesitancy markers for reports and exposition are expressions such as it is alleged, it is suggested, and perhaps.

Turn-taking is another important part of the distancing principle because part of the cooperation in conversations is based on the fact that in conversations turn-taking is possible. Since the listener is a participant in the construction of oral stories--by nodding "yes," looking quizzical, even adding a phrase here or there--the listener feels an obligation to cooperate with the speaker, to do everything possible to make meaning out of what is said. Even when the listener may know that something may be astray in the story, the listener gives these rough edges

low saliency.

Fictional narratives which imitate conversational stories often use a number of devices to represent the possibility of turn-taking and thereby maintain the cooperation of the reader. Schegloff and Sacks (1973) have identified two techniques available to oral speakers to extend the length of their turn as they approach what would otherwise be a possible completion point: (1) a speaker may speed up so that the pause at the end of a sentence is not long enough to allow anyone else to start; and, (2) a speaker may repeat himself to fill in possible pause areas. In "I Can't Breathe" and the opening of Catcher in the Rye (on page 52), the speed-up of the speaker is suggested by long sentences which are loosely connected. This is especially true in "I Can't Breathe," where many sentences are run together with commas. From "This is our first separation" until the end of the page, there are only six periods.

The possibility of turn-taking is also suggested in the two stories by deictic constructions, which suggest that the narrator and the reader are sharing the same physical space and/or time: (1) "staying in a place like this" and "at dinner this evening" ("I Can't Breathe"); and, (2) "want to hear about it" and "this crumby place" (Catcher in the Rye). In addition, "I Can't Breathe" uses repetition: "it would be a heavenly place . . . if

Walter were here. . . . It would be heavenly if he were here." And finally Catcher in the Rye uses a line which suggests that the reader may have just said or thought something which the narrator wants to clarify: "They're quite touchy about anything like that, especially my father. They're nice and all--I'm not saying that--but they're also touchy as hell." The "I'm not saying that" seems to mean "I'm not saying what you (the reader) are thinking or saying--that is, that my parents may not be nice." Thus, the narrator suggests that the reader is a participant who has taken a kind of half-turn, paraphrasing the narrator's comments in some way.

The cooperation of conversational stories disappears in the third-person narrative. Says Pratt, "Boring lectures and bad jokes annoy us more than boring turns in conversation" (1977:106). Both may be boring to the reader/listener, but lectures and exposition are typically more annoying because the partner has given up rights to turn-taking. Then the narrator engages in a game of "verbal jeopardy" (1977:215), and the reader assumes the audience's "right to judge" (1977:110). The argument here is that readers of third-person narrative are expected to apply their "right to judge," play their uncooperative roles. First- and third-person narratives project specific roles, therefore, for speakers and readers.

Booth (1961:138), Barthes (1977:142-148), Henry James

(in Booth, 1961:49), Chatman (1975:217), Walker Gibson (1950:265-269), Iser (1972), Ong (1975), Hirsch (1977), and others have all described how the reader or the writer or both are rhetorical inventions, whether the form be fiction or exposition. The writer for the specialized journal may feel that his audience is not invented, but in this case the audience is delivered in a certain form by the institutions of which the journal is a part. So, too, the writer may not feel he has invented himself, the narrator. But the institutions helped create that part of him called a specialist. In Grice's view, the imaginative projections of reader and writer "inhere in both sides of the speech transaction" (Hirsch, 1977:29). Writers project readers and writers as they write, and readers project writers and readers as they read.

One critical test of a role theory of texts is whether or not one can identify some reader insights that differ from the insights of the narrator and other characters. The question is how to separate points of view and especially how to avoid possible confusions between the narrator and the author. Booth's discussion of this point illustrates how allegiances can lead to different readings. Booth's (1961) theoretical position, the correct one I think, is that the intentions of the implied author are evident in the reader's reaction. Booth frequently links the reader and the implied author (pp. 157-159):

> For practical criticism probably the most important of these kinds of distance is that between the fallible or unreliable narrator and the implied author who carries the reader with him in judging the narrator. . . . The implied author (carrying the reader with him) may be more or less distant from other characters. . . . Some narrators . . . are placed "as far away" from author and reader as possible.

Furthermore, Booth insists that the writer must make things clear in the text. But the rhetorical problem becomes complicated when what the reader knows is the result of the experience of reading the story, what the character knows is a result of the experience in the story, and what the narrator knows is based on a set of experiences which happened at another time, unknown by the character and not experienced by the narrator. Such a situation occurs in "Barn Burning," and Booth assumes that what the narrator is saying is an explicit judgment from the author:

> But with all of this said, a larger question remains. Why do we sometimes allow, and even require, authorial assistance? Why should explicit judgment be banned from The Sound and the Fury and allowed in "Barn Burning"? When the young son betrays his father by revealing the father's plans to burn the barn and then flees, never to return, why should we not only allow but welcome a passage like the following?
>
> > At midnight he was sitting on the crest of a hill. He did not know it was midnight and he did not know how far he had come. But there was no glare behind him now and he sat now, his back toward what he had called home for four days anyhow, his face toward the dark woods which he would enter when breath was strong again, small, shaking steadily in the chill darkness, hugging himself into the remainder of his thin, rotten shirt, the grief and despair. Father, My father, he thought. "He was brave!" he cried suddenly,

> aloud but not loud, no more than a whisper: "He was! He was in the war! He was in Colonel Sartoris' cav'ry!" not knowing that his father had gone to that war a private in the fine old European sense, wearing no uniform, admitting the authority of and giving fidelity to no man or army or flag, going to war as Malbrouck himself did: for booty--it meant nothing and less than to him if it were enemy booty or his own. (my italics)

> I cannot pretend to any very satisfactory answer to the question, but clearly it cannot be answered by looking at general rules about whether the author's voice is a flaw. We can say with some confidence that the poignancy of the boy's lonely last-ditch defense of his father is greatly increased by letting us know that even that defense is unjustified. This takes us some way toward an answer. (Booth, 1961:308)

Another interpretation is possible and I think probable, given my experience teaching high school seniors. At first the student readers find the father a loathsome character. Then, in the scene at the big white house, where the father grinds his foot into the rug, the student readers find the father even more loathsome but at the same time more admirable. That is, the father, given his station in life, refuses to bow and scrape. The reader's contradictory responses grow and intensify throughout the rest of the story, until the concluding pages, ending with "He went on down the hill. . . . He did not look back." At this point Booth sees a young man who is leaving a father who has no moral justification. Booth believes that the reader should understand the narrator's contradiction of the boy's view, beginning with the line "not knowing. . . ."

But the fact is that, even though the narrator

emphasizes a negative view with the line beginning "not knowing," the implied reader instead is left with admiration for the father in the lines "admitting the authority of and giving fidelity to no man or army or flag" and a perception of the father's going to war for booty as a last act of rebellion against an unjust system. One might claim some textual hints in the fact that the narrator does identify the father's act with "the fine old European sense" and with "Malbrouck himself." But the strongest influences for what happens to the reader come from the previous events. The implied reader of this story--and many of Faulkner's stories--is one who values pride in oneself as a human being, despite all the efforts to crush that pride and individuality. At the same time Faulkner's reader must be one who values moral order and the social systems necessary to maintain that order--putting barn burners in jail, for instance. Therefore, the implied reader in Faulkner is forced to undergo a change, beginning with a faith in the moral order and social system, fairly quickly established in the opening scene where the father is tried, and changing to understanding of the father's pride, an understanding which evolves throughout the story.

Therefore, in "Barn Burning" the narrator, implied reader and story character have different interpretations of events:

Narrator:	Implied Reader:
"The boy's defense of the father is unjustified."	"The boy's defense may be wrong, but some defense is necessary, and the boy is right that the father was brave."

Story Character:

The Boy: "Father was brave and fought in Colonel Sartoris' Cavalry."

The distancing principle, therefore, assumes that narrator, author, reader, and character are roles created by authors in the construction of speech events. Furthermore, changing the distancing from cooperative to uncooperative or from idiomatic to non-idiomatic speech events changes the roles of narrators, readers, and authors. How do these roles change in different kinds of speech events?

One kind of non-idiomatic speech event in fictional prose, called by Barthes Zero Degree writing, puts the narrator in the role of objective journalist:

> In this same attempt towards disengaging literary language, here is another solution: to create a colourless writing. . . . [W]e know that some linguists establish between two terms of a polar opposition (such as singular-plural, preterite-present) the existence of a third term, called a neutral term or zero element: thus between the subjective and the imperative moods, the indicative is according to them an amodal form. Proportionately speaking, writing at the zero degree is basically in the indicative mood, or if you like, amodal; it would be accurate to say that it is a journalist's writing, if it were not precisely the case that journalism develops, in general, operative or imperative (that is, emotive) forms. (1979:76-77)

This colorless, journalistic writing, choosing to avoid the emotive and imperative forms of conversations, presents the objective fact, and the narrator assumes that the reader will be cooperative and accept the facts as facts. The reader has, given the situation, no other choice because the fictional facts have no independent existence making independent verification possible. The narrator of journalism or a news bulletin does not speculate, does not explain, does not present subjective evaluations, and expects the reader, apparently, not to seek explanations, answers, and theories among the facts. But Zero Degree writing is a non-idiomatic case, and in such cases cooperation is suspended. Readers, refusing to cooperate with the narrator's intention of keeping the discussion factual, must in non-idiomatic cases speculate about causes and effects, motivation, and general laws of nature and human behavior.

Zero Degree narrators, however, insist, "These are the facts, and that's it." All narrators project an image of themselves. In Zero Degree writing, narrators have the image of a conduit conveying a story which originates either in the facts of experience, as in the news story, or in the forgotten past of a long tradition, as in some types of myth. The narrator in Steinbeck's The Pearl is an example of a conduit originating in the forgotten past: "In the town they tell the story of the great pearl, how it

was found and how it was lost again." The narrator is like the oral poet of myth; a muse or tradition is speaking through him. He is not the creator or perceiver of the story.

The implied reader sees the narrator as mirror of the facts of events, not as a mediator of those events, and sees the act of reading as like the observation of events, the narrator reporting without theorizing. If any theorizing is to be done, it will be done by the reader, not the narrator. "If this story is a parable, perhaps everyone takes his own meaning from it and reads his own life into it." The mythic form of Steinbeck's story presents problems for modern readers who expect either to cooperate or not to cooperate with a narrator's intentions. Cassirer (1946:90-92) makes clear how myth differs from other forms:

> If, now, we contrast this form of logical conception by species and genera with primitive forms of mythic and linguistic conception, we find immediately that the two represent entirely different tendencies of thought. Whereas in the former a concentric expansion over ever widening spheres of perception and conception takes place, we find exactly the opposite moving of thought giving rise to mythic ideation. The mental view is not widened but compressed; it is, so to speak, distilled into a single point. . . . Logical contemplation always has to be carefully directed toward the extension of concepts; classical syllogistic logic is ultimately nothing but a system of rules for combining, subsuming, and superimposing concepts. . . . In mythico-linguistic thought, however, exactly the opposite tendency prevails. . . . Every part of the whole is the whole itself; every specimen is equivalent to the entire species. The part does not merely represent the whole or the specimen in its class;

> they are identical with the totality to which they belong. . . .

The difference between the analysis presented in this paper and the analysis of Cassirer is that the contrast is not between classical logic and mythic logic, but among classical logic (the uncooperative principle), natural language logic (the cooperative principle), and mythic logic. The problem, then, for the modern reader is that the mythic form leaves the reader nothing to do except examine the part or the fact for itself alone. No extensions are apparently necessary or required for the narrator. But Steinbeck knows that the modern reader is prepared to be cooperative or uncooperative, and thus Steinbeck suggests that "perhaps" the reader might see an analogy between his life and the events in the story or some other kind of meaning. In other words, if you, the reader, insist on doing something, then draw analogies or "take your own meaning," but do not expect the narrator to do either one or to demand that the reader do so. The problem of what the role of the reader should be in Zero Degree writing is examined in greater detail in the next section on processing. For the moment, at the distancing level, the implied reader simply reads for the facts of the event and privately speculates about his/her own meaning, recognizing that such speculation is beyond the intentions of the narrator.

Myth and journalism are, then, variations of

non-idiomatic fictional prose in which modern readers, at least, do not cooperate with the intentions of narrators. Readers theorize while narrators refuse to do so. In other types of non-idiomatic prose, readers criticize the theories presented by narrators. Now let's consider variations among examples of idiomatic or conversational prose. In the selections on pages 52 and 53 from "I Can't Breathe," Catcher in the Rye, and The Great Gatsby, the words marking close personal distance (I, you, me, and informalities like crap, won't, madman stuff, and isn't) are more frequent in Catcher in the Rye (.09) and "I Can't Breathe" (.08) and less frequent in The Great Gatsby (.06).

This distinction is consistent with one's intuitive impressions. The fact is that The Great Gatsby, although written in the first person, is less conversational than Catcher in the Rye and "I Can't Breathe," moving the narrator of The Great Gatsby closer to the narrators of third-person fictional prose. As a result, the implied reader of The Great Gatsby is more suspicious and uncooperative than the implied reader of either Catcher in the Rye or "I Can't Breathe." The implied reader of "I Can't Breathe" and Catcher in the Rye knows that the narrators of these stories are unreliable in one way or another, but at least these narrators maintain a cooperative, personal distance, showing their flaws up-close. Thus, the implied reader feels that an easy cooperation is possible. But the situation is slightly

different in The Great Gatsby. Here the implied reader, although basically cooperative with the narrator, recognizes that there is some distance here which adds some degree of suspicion. The implied reader is aware of the narrator's self-righteous attitude because of and despite the distance which the narrator attempts to maintain. The suspicion is confirmed on the next page (the second page):

> And, after boasting this way of my tolerance, I come to the admission that it has a limit. Conduct may be founded on hard rock or the wet marshes, but after a certain point I don't care what it's founded on. When I came back from the East last autumn I felt that I wanted the world to be in uniform and at a sort of moral attention forever; I wanted no more riotous excursions with privileged glimpses into the human heart. Only Gatsby, the man who gives his name to this book, was exempt from my reaction--Gatsby, who represented everything for which I have an unaffected scorn.

The point is that this narrator, the older Nick, gives us close, personal reactions when the subject is Gatsby, encouraging trust and cooperativeness from the reader, but maintains some slight distance on other matters, leaving the implied reader with some slight suspicion about surrounding details.

In summary, the speech events in fictional prose do have different degrees of distancing between narrators and implied readers. Instances of idiomatic conversational prose--for example, Ring Lardner's "Haircut" (called Skaz by the Russian Formalists)--establish close distances between narrators and implied readers and suggest a

systematic cooperation between them. This intimacy is marked by evidence of turn-taking opportunities and evidence of camaraderie rules for politeness. Instances of non-idiomatic prose, on the other hand, establish some distance between implied narrator and tne implied reader, the most obvious example being formal, third-person prose. Turn-taking opportunities are absent, formality rules of politeness are evoked, the implied reader plays the role of uncooperative judge, and the implied narrator places himself/herself in verbal jeopardy.

Writers of exposition are in verbal jeopardy because they know that under the rules governing speech events readers must judge and criticize, and writers of news reports have a different kind of verbal jeopardy because they know that readers, following the rule of always asking "What does it all mean," will insist on speculating about causes and future results. In the next section, we will examine the characteristics of processing in the speech events underlying fictional prose.

The Processing Characteristics

Many theories of narrative assume an underlying relationship between a narrator and a reader, but fewer theories assume that fictional prose has an underlying assumption about reality. Yet Paul Ricoeur has argued that Heidegger was right when he said:

> . . . what we understand first in a discourse is not another person, but a project, that is, the outline of a new being-in-the-world. Only writing, in freeing itself, not only from its author but from the narrowness of the dialogical situation, reveals this destination of discourse as projecting a world. (Ricoeur, 1979:79)

Ricoeur is not arguing here that texts are not anchored in a rhetorical situation. He says that "the tie between speaker and discourse is not abolished, but distended and complicated" (p. 78). The text invents rules for writers and readers, and thus creates its own rhetorical situation underlying the story or context. Ricoeur is arguing that the text projects a world view. The processing characteristics of speech events project this image of reality, projecting either a reality which is always approximate and best described with casual estimates or a reality which is always normative and hierarchical and best approached with formal, logical analysis.

Clark and Clark have argued that what they call the reality principle is an assumption of conversations, co-occurring with the cooperative principle of Grice:

> According to the reality principle, listeners interpret sentences in the belief that the speaker is referring to a situation or set of ideas they can make sense of. On this basis, listeners can build up an internal model of that situation piece by piece. (Clark and Clark, 1977:72)

In Clark and Clark's model, reality is easily knowable. But in non-idiomatic speech events, particularly third-person expositions, the participants assume reality is more difficult to know because it requires logical form, not

casual estimates. These two different assumptions, that reality is either easy to know or hard to know, are marked by different words. For instance, a number of studies have suggested that conversational speech events have more simple coordinators (and, but) and sequencers (then, so) than do formal written materials, which tend to have more embedders (which, because) and parallelisms (not/but, either/or) (Loban, 1976; Kroll, 1977; Chafe, 1979). Schorer (1950: 426) has noted that coordinating conjunctions like and and but "suggest that the several elements in a sentence have equal importance or unimportance." The suggestion that all elements are equal is another way of saying that the elements describe a reality which does not require complicated tools of analysis and which is rather easy to know. However, connectives like because, which, if, although, and how elevate some elements and subordinate others, creating a hierarchy in the organization of reality. The writer who uses subordinators is projecting a reality which is more difficult to know and to analyze.

The processing characteristics of speech events also project an assumption that reality is best approached either directly or indirectly. George Lakoff's distinctions among different types of hedges helps clarify the differences between an indirect and a direct approach to reality. First of all, hedges themselves can only be applied to situations in which some qualification is necessary:

* (a) A robin is sort of a bird.

* (b) A robin is technically a bird.

(c) A penguin is sort of a bird.

(d) A penguin is technically a bird.

The first two sentences are false (or not reasonable) in Lakoff's terms because a robin "is a bird, no question about it" (1975:234). In other words, one cannot hedge something that by the nature of its meaning leaves no room for hedging. But the last two sentences are possible because a penguin, although a bird, is, nevertheless, not as typical of birds as a robin. Thus, penguin can be hedged.

But how something is hedged is also important. First of all, sort of is more informal than technically, suggesting a casual and indirect approach to categorization. Technically suggests a technical and direct approach. The contrast between loosely speaking and strictly speaking illustrates a similar difference:

* (a) Loosely speaking, a whale is a mammal.

(b) Strictly speaking, a whale is a mammal.

(c) Loosely speaking, a whale is a fish.

* (d) Strictly speaking, a whale is a fish.

(d) is false (or not reasonable), says Lakoff, because calling a whale a fish is an approximation of reality, not a definition, and strictly speaking refers to a "definitional and primary criteria" for category membership. (a) is

false because saying that a whale is a mammal is a definition of reality, not an approximation, and loosely speaking is an approximation in the sense that it refers to secondary, not primary, criteria (1975:239-40).

The contrast between loosely speaking and regular illustrates how two indirect hedges can themselves mark a difference, regular marking estimates about general similarities and loosely marking estimates about category membership:

(a) Harry is a regular fish.

(b) Loosely speaking, Harry is a fish.

(b) seems strange, according to Lakoff, because "it asserts that Harry is a member of the category fish to some degree by virtue of having some secondary property of fish." But, says Lakoff, (a) "simply says that he swims well and is at home in the water, while it presupposes that he is not a member of the category fish whatsoever" (1975:239).

In summary, the indirect hedges are words like sort of, loosely speaking, regular, kind of, somewhat--all of them referring to either secondary or incidental criteria and all of them typical of informal usages of classification. The direct hedges are words like technically, strictly speaking, relatively, essentially, in a sense, and in a fashion--all of them referring to definitional and primary criteria and all of them typical of formal usages of classification. In general, indirect hedges provide

approximations of reality, and direct hedges provide normative definitions of reality.

Another group of words operates in ways very similar to hedges. First of all, there are the informal intensifiers like a lot, plenty, very, and pretty (much). Robin Lakoff (1980:46) has argued that these intensifiers, although appearing to be very direct, are, as a matter of fact, indirect:

> They state their claims more weakly than do simple direct performative utterances. Intensives do so by more roundabout means, but the fact remains that the strongest argument is the most direct and understated.

These intensifiers, like the indirect hedges, have their counterparts in generalizers like largely, typically, in general, and in essence--all of them formal and direct. The argument here is that the generalizers are more direct because they are more understated.

In summary, processing characteristics divide themselves between the easy, indirect, approximate reality of informal, conversational speech events, marked by such words as and, sort of, and plenty, and the difficult, direct reality of formal, explanatory or lecture-type speech events, marked by such words as because, which, technically, and in general. The question is whether the processing dimension from easy approximations to difficult hierarchies is an underlying dimension of fictional narrative in the same way that the distancing dimension is.

The three selections on pages 53 and 54 from "Why I Live at the P.O.," The Pearl, and The Mayor of Casterbridge are examples of three different speech events as an underlying form of fictional narrative. The distribution of the processing traits is as follows (divide markers by total words):

	Approximations Easy Reality	Definitions Difficult Reality
"Why I Live at the P.O."	.10	.04
The Pearl	.10	.05
The Mayor of Casterbridge	.03	.08

The Mayor of Casterbridge has the lowest percentage of markers of an approximate, easy reality and the highest percentage of a hierarchical, difficult reality. This distribution is consistent with our intuitions about the narrator, who projects a world which has hierarchical, normative order, some things subordinated to others, and which can be analyzed and understood but not without difficulty. The world projected here is not approached casually and easily.

What may seem surprising is the fact that The Pearl and "Why I Live at the P.O." have almost the same distribution of approximations and definitions. The difference in speech events underlying the two narratives becomes more apparent when the distributions are added for markers of close distancing (I, me, informalities and so forth):

	Close Distancing Emotive Markers
"Why I Live at the P.O."	.12
The Pearl	.00
The Mayor of Casterbridge	.00

In other words, the two stories distribute combinations of processing and distancing quite differently. "Why I Live at the P.O." is very much like a social conversation, the distancing very close and the approach to reality easy, simple, and approximate. The Pearl, on the other hand, has a similar approach to reality, simple and approximate, but a quite different distancing, establishing a detachment very close to that found in The Mayor of Casterbridge. But The Mayor of Casterbridge differs from the other two by establishing a normative and more intellectual approach to reality and keeping a detachment between the implied narrator and the implied reader.

The Pearl, as noted earlier, is similar to Zero Degree writing and projects itself as myth. In such a form, the facts of events are all. The and's mark an approach to reality in which theorizing and organizing are resisted. Things are presented, as much as possible, as they appear to be. A remarkable quiet and sameness are conveyed in the scene on page 53, despite the fact that the pearl has been found, people are shouting, excitement is in the air. In this mythic approach to reality, all things are oddly

equal. No matter how much things change, things remain the same.

In "Why I Live at the P.O.," however, we encounter an approximate reality projected by an emotive narrator. The and's in this story have the effect not of mythic timelessness, as in the myth, but of empty values. The and's equalize events, give them the same value and thus no value, and at the same time the narrator is giving emotive emphasis to matters which are clearly trivial. In fact, absurdly and humorously so. The implied reader, recognizing that the speech event is a cooperative conversation, takes the story for what it is, a social interchange. In this way, the humor is possible. A less conversational style would evoke the reader's criticism and reduce the possibilities of humor.

The Modeling Characteristics of Speech Events

Modeling refers to the third set of characteristics which are typical of speech events in sociolinguistic theory. These characteristics include the setting, mode or channel of communication. In non-literary language situations, the channel might be a telephone, a stage for a lecture, a bulletin board--each channel helping shape the speech event in a particular way. The channel in fictional prose is a particular kind of text. Two dimensions characterize a text as a channel of communication: (1) message transparency, being either opaque or clear; and,

(2) message permanence, being either temporary and expendable or permanent and non-expendable.

First, a text can be either opaque or clear. That is, the objects and events in the text are either clearly described or only vaguely described. The transparency of the text is marked by words which have some referential congruity to the underlying ideas or meanings (Wheelwright, 1968:76-78). The opaque text, for instance, often has a repetition of verbs like seems, might be, appeared to be, clauses like I didn't know, god knows!, I can only guess, and adjectives like unclear, unseen, and indistinct. These words have a congruity with an underlying meaning that the text is an unclear reflector of events. The clear text, on the other hand, often repeats verbs like analyzed, causes, is related to, clauses like the evidence suggests, the paradigm can be confirmed, there are four reasons for this, nouns like theory, sight, the overall outlines, and adjectives like perfectly clear, distinctly, different, recognized (or accepted). These words have a congruity with an underlying meaning that the text is a clear reflector of events.

The text can also be either temporary and expendable or permanent and non-expendable. The difference is the same as that usually found between oral conversations and formal exposition. That is, the rules of oral conversation dictate that the event is temporary. No one is expected

every day to tape conversation for distribution to others or for filing in an archive. Written forms, however, assume some of the qualities of a monument (Ong, 1977), and formal exposition particularly carries with it the expectations of distribution to others and filing in an archive. The difference between the permanence or impermanence of the text is similar to the difference Fish identifies between discursive and anti-discursive texts:

> The question leads to my second thesis . . . an opposition between two ways of looking at the world. The first is a natural way of discursive or rational understanding; its characteristic motion is one of distinguishing, and the world it delivers is one of separable and discrete entities where everything is in its proper place. The second way is antidiscursive and antirational; rather than distinguishing it resolves, and in the world it delivers the lines of demarcation between places and things fade in the light of an all-embracing unity. (Fish, 1972:3)

Because the dialectical changes from one way to another, Fish calls the dialectical text a self-consuming artifact: ". . . it becomes the vehicle of its own abandonment." The impermanent text in Fish, however, is somewhat different from the impermanent text described here. The impermanent text described here is conversational and, therefore, dialectical, but it might not change its form at all. It may begin as a question and an interchange with an implied reader and stay that way. At the end of reading the text, the meaning, like that in a conversation, is not so much in the words in the exchange as in the meaning that

the implied reader constructs from the exchange. The text in such instances does not present an outline of its position or argument.

The text in other instances, however, is not dialectical or conversational but explicitly presentational or expository. In these instances, the text is permanent and includes titles, complete sentences, and conventional forms of printing. When the text is impermanent, it includes numerous dashes, parentheses, exclamation marks, capitalization of whole words and phrases and sentence fragments, often in an attempt to appear conversational. The personal notes written by sixteen-year-olds are an example of the effort to apply conversational rules to writing.

The introductory school textbook in history or sociology is often an example of the permanent text. Olson describes textbooks as having "an important archival function in preserving what the society takes to be 'true' and 'valid' knowledge, knowledge from which rules of thought and action may be derived. They . . . help to preserve the social order by minimizing dispute" (Olson, 1980:106). Olson's last point emphasizes the importance of archival or permanent texts as coming from some authority, some eternal source which puts the implied reader in a subservient position, one who does not know as much as the narrator's source of knowledge. The narrator of school textbooks always seems to be presenting information which comes from

Tradition and Knowledge. Although subservient to the narrator's Source of Knowledge, the implied reader may not be subservient to the narrator. The implied reader may feel that he/she is getting from the Source some information which is escaping the attention of the narrator.

The speech situation which underlies the school textbook also underlies some types of fictional narrative. For instance, in "Barn Burning," although the implied reader has a view different from that of the narrator, the implied reader still feels subservient to the Source--in this case, the long History and Tradition which has been passing along stories like this for generations. This sense of Source is expressed in such lines as the following:

> It was exactly the same quality which in later years would cause his descendants to overrun the engine before putting a motor car into motion. . . . (Faulkner, p. 165)

This sense of the text as an archive, holding the information from the Source, as mediated by a narrator, gives the text of "Barn Burning" a quality of permanence. It is not a throwaway.

The crucial point here is that terms used for the text are what the text pretends to be, not what the text is. That is, "The Apostate" on page 56 pretends to be a conversation between narrator and someone named Harry. The reader is a listener-participant. Conversations, like social notes passed around classrooms or handwritten messages left in one's office box, are expected to be

impermanent, transitory. In fact, in most high schools it is considered socially improper to save social notes. They are not written to be saved. The same is true of handwritten office messages. If one were to discover that a colleague had saved all of one's office messages, one might very likely feel that the practice was both odd and possibly socially improper. However, one would not have the same feeling about someone saving one's articles. Letters, of course, fall somewhere in between.

Pratt (1977:136-147) argues this point very persuasively, using tellability in place of impermanence and assertability in place of permanence. The question is what one wishes to display in fictional discourse--the fact that something is tellable or the fact that something is assertable. Pratt finds that words like absolutely and marks like exclamation marks, for instance, are tellability markers.

The detachable/non-detachable distinction is another way of talking about permanent and impermanent texts. Goody (1977) has argued, for instance, that the critical difference between oral language and written language is the fact that written language can decontextualize a situation. Conversational stories, which are imitations of oral language situations, are usually set in a particular place; they are texts with roots in a given location. In this sense non-detachable texts are dependent on a given

location and, therefore, more transitory. Both "The Apostate" and The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn are narratives with an underlying text which is marked as casual, transitory and unimportant. The Pearl, however, is marked as premeditated, permanent, and important.

Transitory and non-detachable texts are marked first by beginnings which seem to lack adequate preliminaries and by endings which seem to leave too many issues unresolved. Second, sentence fragments, dashes, ellipses, parenthetical expressions, and a general skipping about in the material suggest the fragmentary quality of the text. Third, the exclamation marks, the capitalizations of whole words, and first-person titles suggest a text which cannot easily be detached from a given social situation. Permanent and detachable texts, on the other hand, are marked by beginnings with adequate preliminaries and endings with some resolution, by third-person titles, sometimes with explanatory subtitles, and by subdivisions within the book, particularly the author preface and the division of the book into Parts I, II, III.

The selections on page 56 are examples of prose fiction with an expendable and opaque text. The expendable quality is suggested in "The Apostate" by the five exclamation marks which raise the intensity of the contact. The conventions require that one assume that such intensity must be temporary and a throwaway device. This is the

assumption in oral notes. The uses of well and such expresions as "Don't never get it into your head that . . ." and "It's not meant to be personal" are indications that, when the narrator says "I'm going to tell you the whyfor and the whereof and the howcome about this," the narrator actually intends to continue in an opaque manner, harmlessly clouding the real issues. The openings from The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn and The Stranger are similar. The narrator of Twain's book acts as if the present story is a continuation of the last story which it "ain't no matter" whether the reader has read or not. The transitory quality of the text is suggested again in the use of well, the usage of slang (without for unless, mostly for primarily) and the expressions, like those at the end of the first paragraph, which are expressive (of the narrator's personality) but off the immediate subject.

In The Stranger, the first fact is immediately qualified: "Or, maybe, yesterday; I can't be sure. . . . Which leaves the matter doubtful; it could have been yesterday." This uncertainty of fact is accompanied by material which becomes increasingly irrelevant to the immediate subject: "Still, I had an idea he looked annoyed. . . . Afterwards it struck me I needn't have said that. I had no reason to excuse myself; it was up to him. . . ." By this point, the main point of attending the mother's funeral has been lost or buried among irrelevancies. In

this way, the text becomes not only transitory but opaque. One wonders "What is the point of it all?" In summary, the impermanent text has an uncertain and subjective knowledge, most matters being vague and uncertain.

The selection on page 57 illustrates the opposite tendencies. The Faulkner selection has a submerged thesis statement, but as one reads the paragraph, one finds the theme of the first sentence reiterated. The selection from "The Bear," like the earlier Faulkner selection from "Barn Burning," refers to a source of knowledge which exists prior to the young boy's perception of it: "It ran in his knowledge before he ever saw it" and "It was as if the boy had already divined what his senses and intellect had not encompassed yet." In a Faulkner story, the talking is not for the sake of talking. It is for the sake of the assertability of knowledge and tradition. In the paragraph just before the selection on page 57, Faulkner's narrator says that young Isaac McCaslin had for six years now heard the "best of all talking" and that this talking was

> . . . quiet and weighty and deliberate for retrospection and recollection and exactitude among the concrete trophies--the racked guns and the heads and skins--in the libraries of town houses or the offices of plantation houses or (and best of all) in the camps themselves where the intact and still-warm meat yet hung.

Faulkner's underlying speech event is a permanent historical record of occurrences which have already been immortalized in the trophies stored in the archives of

libraries and town houses. The underlying speech event of "The Apostate," however, is a conversation, which is transitory and impermanent. These underlying speech events are the conventions which the writers use to shape the meaning of the two stories. On a literary level, however, the authors of both "The Apostate" and "The Bear," of course, want to create literary texts which are non-transitory. Thus text has two meanings in this argument, one referring to the surface text of the literary work and the other referring to the speech events underlying the literary work and shaping the meaning of the work through conventions of speech events. In the latter definition, "The Bear" is permanent and "The Apostate" is transitory.

The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn and The Mayor of Casterbridge present an interesting contrast in the way the texts are marked by the authors. Twain puts a notice and an explanatory note before the opening of the story (see page 56). The notice says that the text is not to be taken seriously as having either a plot or a moral. In other words, the text is transitory and expendable. But this notice is signed by an invented author, not Twain in his own voice: "By order of the Author, Per G.G., Chief of Ordnance." The notice that the text is to be taken as transitory and expendable is only a clarification of the kind of speech event underlying the fictional narrative. As a matter of fact Twain, the actual author, entertains

some hope that his creation of a narrative and a speech event will be taken seriously. Otherwise, why the explanatory note on the dialects used in the text? This note is signed by the author himself.

In The Mayor of Casterbridge, Hardy is creating a speech event in which the text is to be permanent and clearly making a point. While Twain undermines his third-person title with chapter titles like "I Discover Moses and the Bulrushers" and "Our Gang's Dark Oath," Hardy reinforces his third-person title with a sub-title: "A Story of a Man of Character." The preface reinforces the notion that the book is a historical record with sources in a well documented tradition: "The incidents narrated arise mainly out of three events" and "The story is more particularly the story of one man's deeds." Finally, Hardy, like Twain, goes to some trouble to explain how he handles dialect. Twain may be creating the pretense that the narrator is not to be taken seriously but that he, like Hardy, wants to be taken seriously as a writer.

In summary, examples of transitory and opaque speech events are "The Apostate," The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, "I Can't Breathe," Catcher in the Rye and "Why I Live at the P.O." Each text is marked as uncertain (I don't feel like going into it, goodness knows there isn't likely to anything happen, Now I don't want you to take this personal, he told the truth, mainly, I can't be sure,

which is a deliberate, calculated falsehood), as impermanent (I will keep a diary while I am here to help pass the time, I'll just tell you about this madman stuff, No siree! Not a-tall! But, just between you and I, You don't know about me . . . but that ain't no matter, Mr. Whitaker! . . . the first thing she did was separate! From Mr. Whitaker!), and non-detachable in openings without preliminaries (I am staying here, I was getting along fine, If you really want to hear about it, You don't know about me, Harry, you been jacking me up). The Pearl and The Mayor of Casterbridge, however, are permanent texts marked by detachable openings (In the town they tell the story, One evening of late summer, before the nineteenth century had reached one-third of its span), clarity of statement (Kino awakened in the near dark, They were plainly but not ill clad), and assertability of ideas and/or facts (And the music of the pearl drifted to a whisper and disappeared, whose youth had seemed to teach that happiness was but the occasional episode in a general drama of pain).

Summary

Speech events have three dimensions--distancing, processing, and modeling. Each of these dimensions has a continuum with different degrees of various features. Distancing, for instance, has different degrees of cooperation. This dimension, representing the relationship between the narrator and the reader, has a cooperative

reader at one end of the continuum and a critical, non-cooperative reader at the other end. In the middle is a reader who cooperates on the facts, accepting them as stated, and does not cooperate on generalities, insisting on adding them when they are not stated. The cooperative reader is paired with a narrator who shares the development of meaning with the reader, and the non-cooperative reader is paired with narrators who assume they must develop everything themselves. Processing, the dimension describing the world projected by a speech event, has a continuum with an easy, approximate world at one end and a difficult, normative world at the other end. In the middle is a world which is factually definitive but lawfully unknown. That is, the facts are exact, and the laws of nature are unstated. Finally, modeling describes the medium or channel of the speech event underlying fictional prose. In other words, a literary work has two levels of text, the literary text on the surface and the conventions of text in the underlying speech event. Modeling refers to the dimensions of the second type of text and has a continuum with an impermanent, transitory text or channel at one end and a permanent, intransitory text or channel at the other end. In the middle is a text which provides permanent storage for facts and lists. Nothing else.

From "I Can't Breathe" by Ring Lardner

I am staying here at the Inn for two weeks with my Uncle Nat and Aunt Jule and I think I will keep a kind of a diary while I am here to help pass the time and so I can have a record of things that happen though goodness knows there isn't likely to anything happen, that is, anything exciting with Uncle Nat and Aunt Jule making the plans as they are both at least 35 years old and maybe older. . . .

This is our first separation since we have been engaged, nearly 17 days. It will be 17 days tomorrow. And the hotel orchestra at dinner this evening played that old thing "Oh how I miss you tonight" and it seemed as if they must be playing it for my benefit though, of course, the person in that song is talking about how they miss their mother though, of course, I miss mother, too, but a person gets used to missing their mother and it isn't like Walter or the person you are engaged to.

But there won't be any more separations much longer, we are going to be married in December even if mother does laugh when I talk to her about it because she says I am crazy to even think of getting married at 18.

She got married herself when she was 18, but of course that was "different," she wasn't crazy like I am, she knew whom she was marrying. As if Walter were a policeman or a foreigner or something. And she says she was only engaged once while I have been engaged at least five times a year since I was 14, of course, it really isn't as bad as that and I have really only been really what I call engaged six times altogether, . . .

From <u>The Catcher in the Rye</u> by J. D. Salinger

If you really want to hear about it, the first thing you'll probably want to know is where I was born, and what my lousy childhood was like, and how my parents were occupied and all before they had me, and all that David Copperfield kind of crap, but I don't feel like going into it, if you want to know the truth. In the first place, that stuff bores me, and in the second place, my parents would have about two hemorrhages apiece if I told anything pretty personal about them. They're quite touchy about anything like that, especially my father. They're nice and all--I'm not saying that--but they're also touchy as hell.

From The Great Gatsby by F. Scott Fitzgerald

Chapter I

In my younger and more vulnerable years my father gave me some advice that I've been turning over in my mind ever since.

"Whenever you feel like criticizing any one," he told me, "just remember that all the people in this world haven't had the advantages that you've had."

He didn't say any more, but we've always been unusually communicative in a reserved way, and I understood that he meant a great deal more than that. In consequence, I'm inclined to reserve all judgments, a habit that has opened up many curious natures to me and also made me the victim of not a few veteran bores. The abnormal mind is quick to detect and attach itself to this quality when it appears in a normal person, and so it came about that in college I was unjustly accused of being a politician, because I was privy to the secret griefs of wild, unknown men.

From "Why I Live at the P.O." by Eudora Welty

I was getting along fine with Mama, Papa-Daddy and Uncle Rondo until my sister Stella-Rondo just separated from her husband and came back home again. Mr. Whitaker! Of course I went with Mr. Whitaker first, when he first appeared here in China Grove, taking "Pose Yourself" photos, and Stella-Rondo broke us up. Told him I was one-sided. Bigger on one side than the other, which is a deliberate, calculated falsehood: I'm the same. Stella-Rondo is exactly twelve months to the day younger than I am and for that reason she's spoiled.

From The Pearl by John Steinbeck

"In the town they tell the story of the great pearl--how it was found and how it was lost again. They tell of Kino, the fisherman, and of his wife, Juana, and of the baby, Coyotito. And because the story has been told so often, it has taken root in every man's mind. And, as with all retold tales that are in people's hearts, there are only good and bad things and black and white things and good and evil things and no in-between anywhere.

"If this story is a parable, perhaps everybody takes his own meaning from it and reads his own life into it. In any case, they say in the town that. . ."

I

Kino awakened in the near dark. The stars still shone and the day had drawn only a pale wash of light in the lower sky to the east. The roosters had been crowing. . . .

From The Mayor of Casterbridge by Thomas Hardy

One evening of late summer, before the nineteenth century had reached one-third of its span, a young man and woman, the latter carrying a child, were approaching the large village of Weydon-Priors, in Upper Wessex, on foot. They were plainly but not ill clad, though the thick hoar of dust which had accumulated on their shoes and garments from an obviously long journey lent a disadvantageous shabbiness to their appearance just now.

The man was of fine figure, swarthy, and stern in aspect; and he showed in profile a facial angle so slightly inclined as to be almost perpendicular. He wore a short

jacket of brown corduroy, newer than the remainder of his suit, which was a fustian waistcoat with white horn buttons, breeches of the same, tanned leggings, and a straw hat overlaid with black glazed canvas.

From "The Apostate" by George Milburn

Harry, you been jacking me up about how I been neglecting Rotary here lately, so I'm just going to break down and tell you something. Now I don't want you to take this personal, Harry, because it's not meant personal at all. No siree! Not a-tall! But, just between you and I, Harry, I'm not going to be coming out to Rotary lunches any more. I mean I'm quitting Rotary! . . .

Now whoa there! Whoa! Whoa just a minute and let me get in a word edgeways. Just let me finish my little say.

From The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn
("I Discover Moses and the Bulrushers")
by Mark Twain

You don't know about me without you have read a book by the name of The Adventures of Tom Sawyer; but that ain't no matter. That book was made by Mr. Mark Twain, and he told the truth, mainly. There was things which he stretched, but mainly he told the truth. That is nothing. I never seen anybody but lied one time or another, without it was Aunt Polly, or the widow, or maybe Mary. Aunt Polly--Tom's Aunt Polly, she is--and Mary, and the Widow Douglas is all told about in that book, which is mostly a true book, with some stretchers, as I said before.

From The Stranger by Albert Camus

I

Mother died today. Or, maybe, yesterday; I can't be sure. The telegram from the Home says: "Your mother passed away. Funeral tomorrow. Deep sympathy." Which leaves the matter doubtful; it could have been yesterday.

The Home for Aged Persons is at Marengo, some fifty miles from Algiers. With the two-o'clock bus I should get there well before nightfall. Then I can spend the night there, keeping the usual vigil beside the body, and be back here by tomorrow evening. I have fixed up with my employer for two days' leave; obviously, under the circumstances, he couldn't refuse. Still, I had an idea he looked annoyed, and I said, without thinking: "Sorry, sir, but it's not my fault, you know."

From "The Bear" by William Faulkner

He realized later that it had begun long before that. It has already begun on that day when he first wrote his age in two ciphers and his cousin McCaslin brought him for the first time to the camp, the big woods, to earn for himself from the wilderness the name and state of hunter provided he in his turn were humble and enduring enough. He had already inherited then, without ever having seen it, the big old bear with one trap-ruined foot that in an area almost a hundred miles square had earned for himself a name, a definite designation like a living man:--the long legend of corncribs broken down and rifled, of shoats and grown pigs and even calves carried bodily into the woods and devoured, and traps and deadfalls overthrown and dogs mangled and slain, and shotgun and even rifle shots delivered at point-blank range yet with no more effect than so many peas blown through a tube by a child--a corridor of wreckage and destruction beginning back before the boy was born, through which sped, not fast but rather with the ruthless and irresistible deliberation of a locomotive, the shaggy tremendous shape. It ran in his knowledge before he ever saw it. It loomed and towered in his dreams before he even saw the unaxed woods. . . .

III. THREE TYPES OF SPEECH EVENTS

This chapter will describe how the features of distancing, processing, and modeling cluster to form three distinct registers or styles in speech events. The division of these three distinct registers is based on three assumptions: (1) the difference between first-person and third-person prose is fundamental; (2) part of the implicit linguistic competence of readers and writers is the categorization of speech events by prototypes or typical instances, not a set of features; and, (3) a speech event has a projected author, narrator, reader, world, and speech event text, and the author is sometimes different from, sometimes the same as, the narrator. The criticisms of the third assumption were discussed in the previous chapter. There also have been criticisms of the assumption that style typologies can be constructed around prototypes and the assumption that the distinction between first- and third-person is fundamental.

First, the criticism of style typologies. Sociolinguistic studies have clustered the characteristics of participants (distancing), purpose (processing), and channel or setting (modeling) in typical speech events such as conversations (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson, 1974),

lecturing and chatting (Brown and Fraser, 1979), the newspaper report and legal documents (Crystal and Davy, 1969), planned and unplanned discourse (Keenan, 1977), and oral and written situations (Olson, 1977). But in literary criticism, typologies are not readily accepted by some partisans of style studies:

> A typology is a classification and a typology of styles is an arrangement of styles into categories such as periods of time (Elizabethan, Restoration, Victorian, or modern), kinds of influence or derivation, such as Euphuistic, Senecan, Ciceronian, or of impression, such as ornate, formal, learned, simple, plain, and casual. Such classifications are based on the belief that groups of writers have styles that are alike and that any single member of such a group is typical of it. I am convinced that this belief, which has a certain antiquity in literary history, is false and unnecessary. It cannot contribute anything to our understanding of literary style. (Millic, 1967:66)

Millic's criticism of typologies--that members of a category must have exactly the same features of the category and that any single member must be typical of the category--assumes a classical logician's approach to defining words and establishing typologies. For the classical logician, a word has meaning if it is used in a sentence, and one can specify the necessary and/or sufficient conditions (or tests) which will establish that the sentence is true or false. One does not have to be able to carry out the test, only state it. For instance, the sentence "Baron Munchausen pulled himself out of the water by lifting himself by the hair" has meaning only if we can

formulate the conditions which the world must meet for the sentence to be true (Allwood, 1977:4).

For classical logicians, things must be true or false, and no other alternative is possible (Allwood, 1977:103). But a sentence like "She is an adolescent" cannot be judged true or false if she is 19 because we cannot specify the boundary conditions when adolescence ends. The solution for logicians has been to talk about different logics and to acknowledge limitations: "We obtain new insights into human language by studying the very limitations of the logical model of it" (Allwood, 1977:171).

Another approach to defining words and establishing typologies, used by ordinary language philosophers, is to search for family resemblances instead of the definitive list of features. Wittgenstein, for instance, argues that words like game or chair do not have a uniform set of necessary and sufficient conditions or features for testing whether something is or is not a game or chair. These terms, says Wittgenstein, have family resemblances in which no single trait or condition need apply to all items which belong in the set (Wittgenstein, 1953:66-67). Thus, Millic's insistence on a single set of features applying to all members of a typology is not a necessary condition for establishing typologies.

Furthermore, Millic's insistence that "any single member of such a group is typical of it" is inconsistent

with what recent psychological research says about how human beings make typologies. Eleanor Rosch (1977), for instance, proposes that the fundamental conceptualization of the world is in terms of discrete prototypes. These prototypes are the basic members of a category, and not all members of the category are equally representative. Rosch had people compose sentences with the word bird in them; then she replaced the word bird with names like eagle, penguin, chicken, and robin; and finally she asked people to rate how sensible the resulting sentences were. People rated sentences with chicken and penguin as odd and sentences with robin as sensible. Robin is the prototype, the more typical instance of the category bird.

The evidence that typologies are held together by prototypes which capture the central tendencies of the typology comes from a variety of sources. For instance, Bruner et al. in a study of thinking discussed the importance of a "typical instance" and reported that subjects had less difficulty in setting a color wheel to the typical color of an orange than to the acceptable boundaries of its color (1956:64). Second, Berlin and Kay (1969) have shown that, in color naming, one must distinguish between focal and non-focal colors. On the color continuum, focal colors are those points which speakers of diverse languages agree represent the best examples of "basic color categories."

There is good evidence, therefore, that Millic's

assumptions about how typologies should be constructed are inconsistent with the way typologies are, in fact, usually made, at least in ordinary language. Millic's views are those of the classical logician who believes that typologies must have discrete boundaries. But in recent years logic itself has been extended from the classical two-valued logic to multivalued logic (Rescher, 1969), modal logics (Snyder, 1971), and fuzzy logics (Zadeh, 1965). Zadeh argues, for instance, that discrete boundaries (or precision) are often incompatible with significance:

> . . . as the complexity of the system increases, our ability to make precise yet significant statements about its behavior diminishes until a threshold is reached beyond which precision and significance (or relevance) become mutually exclusive characteristics. (1973:28)

The premise of Zadeh's logic of fuzzy sets is that humans do not reason in precise, quantitative terms, but rather in the approximate terms of fuzzy sets in which transition from membership to non-membership is gradual. Contrary to Millic's views, a typology can have a fuzzy boundary and still cohere around a prototype or typical instance of the category.

The question of what should be the prototype or typical instance for speech events is answered in functional theory by frequency of use. For instance, Berlin and his colleagues found that plants' generic names like pine and oak were basic and frequent because they are simpler (have fewer words) than categories at upper levels (Berlin

et al., 1973). In sociolinguistic theory, frequent prototypes are conversations (Schegloff, 1972), news reports (Crystal and Davy, 1979), and lectures (Brown and Fraser, 1979). Other divisions of style and register appear in literary theory:

1.	Subjective		Classical (Auerbach, 1953)
2.	Camaraderie	Hesitancy	Formality (Lakoff, R., 1972)
3.	Sweet	Tough	Stuffy (Gibson, 1966)
4.	Intimate		Formal (Joos, 1963; Schorer, 1950)
		Tight-Lipped	

Examples of Sweet, Intimate, and Subjective show that the three terms are similar:

Intimate:

> Very well, Miss Frankenstein, you asked for it. What is wrong with you, my girl, is that there is a Writer inside of you, struggling to break out of the chrysalis. (Joos, 1963:89)

Subjective:

> That's Trimalchio's wife. Fortunata they call her. She measures money by the bushel. Yet not so long ago, what was she? I hope you won't mind my putting it that way, but you wouldn't have accepted a piece of bread from her hands. (Auerbach, 1953:21)

Sweet:

> Dry skin? Not me, darling. Every inch of little me is as smooth as (well you know what). Because I never, never bathe without Sardo. (Gibson, 1966:74)

Examples of Tough and Tight-Lipped are also similar to each other:

Tight-Lipped:

> "Last week he tried to commit suicide," one waiter said.
>
> "Why?"
>
> "He was in despair."
>
> "What about?"
>
> "Nothing." (Schorer, 1950:427)

Tough:

> The trunks of the trees were too dusty and the leaves fell early that year and we saw the troops marching along the road and the dust rising and the leaves stirred by the breeze, falling, and the soldiers marching and afterwards the road bare and white except for the leaves. (Gibson, 1966:36)

And examples of Formal, Stuffy, and Classical also show a similarity:

Formal:

> The style may be speciously like frozen style, but it is not the same thing as formal style is and is not; indeed, this may be called anti-formal style because it reverses the aims of formal style by subordinating information to involvement. Confusingly anti-formal style is found in two varieties, namely as emitted by non-writers like Thomas Wolfe, who simply fill the text with salt tears. . . . (Joos, 1963: 49-50)

Classical:

> The old woman fetched a clean basin which was used as a foot-bath, poured plenty of cold water in and added warm. Odysseus was sitting at the

> hearth, but now he swung abruptly around to face the dark, for it had struck him suddenly that in handling him, she might notice a certain scar he had, and his secret would be out. Indeed, when . . . . (Auerbach, 1953:5)

Stuffy:

> While part of the rising trend for lung cancers is attributable to improvements in diagnosis and the changing age-composition and size of the population, the evidence leaves little doubt that a true increase in lung cancer has taken place. (Gibson, 1966:92)

In summary, the criticism of typologies of style and the criticism of categorization by prototypes are not consistent with the empirical studies of how people form a category in their everyday lives and not consistent with literary and sociolinguistic studies of style and register. Sociolinguistic theory clusters features around typical instances called speech scenes and activity types (Brown and Fraser, 1979), and linguistic theory clusters features around style typologies. The two approaches are often very closely related. For example, the previous style typologies labeled Sweet, Intimate, and Subjective are narratives with an underlying conversational speech event. Furthermore, the previous examples labeled Tough and Tight-Lipped are narratives with an underlying report speech event, in the same family as news bulletins and newscasts. Finally, the examples labeled Formal, Stuffy, and Classical have an underlying formal lecture or exposition as speech event. Other examples considered thus far would group themselves

as follows:

CONVERSATIONS	REPORTS	FORMAL HISTORIES
"I Can't Breathe"	The Pearl	The Mayor of Casterbridge
Catcher in the Rye		"Barn Burning"
"Why I Live at the P.O."		"The Bear"
Huckleberry Finn		
"The Apostate"		

Conversations, reports and formal histories are like oral forms such as conversations, radio news and lectures. Also, conversations are like written social notes, reports like the daily event bulletins read at school, and the formal histories like the textbooks in history or sociology. The shift from one speech event to another is a shift from one set of assumptions to another. Knowing when to shift from one set of assumptions to another is part of the linguistic competence of readers, and this competence is largely tacit--in the Polanyi sense of speakers knowing and doing things that they are not focally aware of and cannot give an explicit account of-- and intuitive--in the Chomsky sense of patterns or ordered rules which are applied by speakers but which speakers cannot systematically express (Chomsky, 1968; Polanyi, 1966).

The second criticism of the approach taken in this paper is the argument that the differences between first-person and third-person are not fundamental. Thomas Uzzell

(1964:198) has commented that "the first- and third-person differ in no way in 'bringing out' anything. I can see no significant connection between the angle of narration or perspective of a story and the use of 'I' or 'he' . . . whatever can be said in one person can be said in another." Booth (1961:150) seems right when he says that "first or third person will tell us nothing of importance unless we become more precise." Nevertheless the distinction between first and third person is fundamental, as a number of studies have shown.

In linguistics, for instance, Fillmore makes a distinction between what can be said in conversational language and what can be said in third-person narrative:

> Thus of the following three sentences, the third cannot be contextualized within normal conversational language:
>
> He lived there many years ago.
>
> He had lived there many years earlier.
>
> He had lived there many years ago.
>
> In the type of third-person narrative that I have been discussing, there is no such restriction, since the pluperfect could result from the backshifting appropriate to represented speech and the word "ago" could be chosen from the central character's point of view at that particular point in the narrative where this "memory" is introduced. (Fillmore, 1974:97)

Similar distinctions are made in the literature on direct and indirect narratives (Banfield, 1973; Banfield, 1978). The point is that what a narrator can say in third-person, represented thought (or style indirect libre) is

not the same thing as what a narrator can say in first-person, direct speech. For instance, some emotive or expressive elements cannot be translated from direct speech to indirect speech:

> Richard protested, "Lord! I don't like it."
>
> * Richard protested that, lord, he didn't like it.
>
> Clarissa whispered, "There!"
>
> * Clarissa whispered that there. (Banfield, 1973:7)

In literary theory, Hamburger (1973:219-292), investigating the different kinds of logic which exist in fictional prose, argues that first-person novels have a logic different from that of third-person novels. She calls the first-person novel the lyrical genre and the third-person novel the fictional genre. The fictional genre, according to Hamburger, can establish a fictive universe outside a "real" time and place: "Mr. X was in America. Tomorrow his plane was leaving." This statement is fictional because in a "real" past tense speech situation--in other words, first-person, direct speech--one cannot say "Tomorrow his plane was leaving."

The distinction between reports and other kinds of third-person narrative is similar to the distinction Barthes makes between Zero Degree writing and other kinds of third-person writing. Barthes says (1979:38):

> Between the third-person as used by Balzac and that used by Flaubert there is a world of difference (that of 1848): in the former we have a

> view of history which is harsh, but coherent and certain of its principles, the triumph of an order; in the latter an art which in order to escape its pangs of conscience either exaggerates conventions or frantically attempts to destroy them.

Barthes traces this tendency in Flaubert to what Barthes calls the Zero Degree writing in modern literature. In this writing, "The Word is no longer guided in advance by the general intention of a socialized discourse," it is "deprived of the guide of selective connections," and the style is "encyclopedic" (Barthes, 1979:48). Later Barthes says that Zero Degree writing is an attempt to "create a colourless writing." In fact, says Barthes, if it were not for the fact that journalism sometimes creates imperative and emotive forms, "it would be accurate to say that it is a journalist's writing" (Barthes, 1979:76). Report writing is the label given here for the kind of writing Barthes is talking about, and the newspaper report is a common non-literary example of the form.

In summary, then, person is a fundamental distinction of point of view, making it possible to say some things and impossible to say others. In addition, there are important distinctions within person categories, particularly between the third person of reports, Zero Degree writing, and the third person of exposition, Balzac's prose. The notion of speech event is useful for describing the literary work as composing experience for the writer and as a reading experience for the reader. Mark Schorer (1948), describing

the composing experience, suggests that the narrator is a discovery device for the writer. For instance, the narrator of Wuthering Heights provides a point of view toward the material that not only shapes what the reader knows about the events but also becomes a technique of discovery for the author. The author, using a narrator different from herself, discovers a perspective about her material which she may not have known when she first started the book. The narrator, in this case Lockwood, has a particular style which suggests his attitudes toward the events in the book. The narrator is assumed to be talking to a reader in a particular setting. In other words, a speech event is assumed.

Booth (1961:74), describing the reading experience, says that style is "one of the main sources of insight into the author's norms." But what are the author's norms? First, an implied author is not the same as the narrator but is closely associated with the reader, who is created by the author, just as the author creates characters (Booth, 1961:73, 49). Booth's views come very close to those of Riffaterre, who argues that style is the means by which a writer obtains certain effects, that "the stylistician must choose only those features which carry out the most conscious intentions of the author," that intentions are not recoverable, and that we must study the responses of the reader because a stylistic device is "so contrived

that the reader cannot overlook it or even read without being guided by its essentials" (1967:412-419). But the stylistic devices "are unpredictable for the decoder," who is the Average Reader, and "the AR's validity is limited to the state of the language he knows." The solution is the application of "context as a criterion and as a corrective to the AR's shortcomings" (1967:424-426).

The fact that an analysis of how words are understood inevitably leads to context and background has led to the development of frame semantics. Says Fillmore (1976:23), ". . . we must add to the description of the grammar and lexicon a description of the cognitive and interactional frames in terms of which the language user interprets his environment, formulates his own messages, and understands the messages of others." Two notions critical to an understanding of frame semantics are the relationship of cognitive and interactional frames, and the notion of prototypes. Interactional frames are those described by sociolinguistics such as greeting frames or larger units like chatting and lecturing. Cognitive frames are general outlines with all of the details not necessarily filled in. Fillmore gives the example of the commercial event frame in which there are goods, money, a buyer, and a seller (Fillmore, 1979). These generalized cognitive frames are very much like the prototypes in Rosch's work. Words have meaning only in some frame, and cognitive frames are

sometimes generalized outlines of events, identified by some typical instances from experience.

In summary, speech events, based on prototypes, are useful ways of describing the relationships among a projected author, reader, narrator, world, and text. The prototypes, based on distinctions between first- and third-person and on different dimensions of distancing, processing, and modeling, include the following:



The three speech events to be discussed in this chapter are conversations, reports, and expositions. In the section that follows, a prototype for each speech event is described, showing how the features of distancing, processing, and modeling cluster: (1) "The Garden Party" by Katherine Mansfield as a prototype for conversational stories; (2) "Soldier's Home" by Ernest Hemingway as a prototype for report stories; and, (3) "Barn Burning" by William Faulkner as a prototype for exposition stories.

"The Garden Party": Conversational Speech Event[1]

The conversational speech event has the following features in its prototype: (1) a narrator who provides some semblance of turn-taking exchange, even in monologue, and who is emotive, stressing the I-you relationship with the reader and using many leaps or intensifiers; (2) a reader who cooperates by filling in details and not judging the narrator harshly; (3) a reality which has an assumed obviousness, easy to understand, and yet has an edge of uncertainty conveyed by approximations in hedges (sort of) and highly exaggerated leaps; and, (4) a text which is non-detachable from the telling situation and which stresses the tellability of events and not their assertability--a trait expressed in fragments, exclamation marks, questions, ellipses(....), and other language signals. All of these traits seem to confirm an interpretation in which Laura's honest innocence seems to triumph over the cruelties and human indifference in the world, triumph to the point that even death seems "so remote, so peaceful . . . wonderful . . . this marvel." Yet the reader knows that this moment and this innocence are transitory. This ending is somewhat unexpected after the living conditions of the workmen and the wealthy Sheridans have been so

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[1] The page numbers of "The Garden Party" refer to "The Garden Party," in Fifty Great Short Stories, ed. Milton Crane (Bantam, 1952).

uncompromisingly contrasted. However, the conversational form helps make the ending possible.

First the distancing principles. The narrator in "The Garden Party," although prototypical in many ways of narrators in conversational stories, is in at least one way an unusual accomplishment. First, what is typical? The narrator establishes the fact that this is a face-to-face conversational story between equals using the signals of an I-you relationship, the informality and colloquial quality of some of the language, and the appearance of turn-taking episodes. The I-you relationship is signaled in the use of you as direct address to the reader at least three times in the story: "As for roses, you could not help feeling that they understood" (first paragraph, first page); "If you stopped to notice, was the air always like this?" (first paragraph, page 4); and, "Wherever you looked, there were couples strolling" (second paragraph, page 10).

The informality and colloquial quality of the language is evident in numerous examples: "couldn't" (page 1 thrice, page 2, page 9, page 10); "didn't" (page 2, page 3); "didn't" (page 2); "wouldn't" (page 2); "mustn't" (page 2); "after all" (page 1, page 10); and, "till" (page 10). Part of the informality is suggested by the emotive language: (1) "so delicious" (page 1); (2) "The very smoke" (page 8); (3) "The very idea" (page 6); (4) "sounded so

fearfully affected" (page 2); and, (5) the opening sentence, "And after all the weather was ideal." The exclamation in unquoted text and expressions like ". . . the puffs looked very attractive. Very." (page 6) contribute to the emotive intensity of the narrator.

This emotive intensity (and conversational "you") from the narrator establishes rules of cooperation for the reader. The reader is encouraged to maintain a cooperative attitude toward the narrator by several instances in which turn-taking episodes are suggested. The first one occurs near the end of the first paragraph: "Hundreds, yes, literally hundreds, had come out in a single night." The pause after the first hundreds, followed by a yes, another pause and then repetition of hundreds with emphasis ("literally hundreds") simulates very closely what happens in a turn-taking episode. The construction conveys the impression that the reader has raised an eyebrow (or the narrator for some reason expects that the reader is going to do it any minute), and the narrator responds to the reader's "comment" with a pause and yes, then the emphatic restatement. Another suggestion of potential turn-taking is on page 3: "It's all the fault, she decided . . . of those absurd class distinctions. Well, for her part, she didn't feel them. Not a bit, not an atom. . . . And now there came the chock-chock of wooden hammers. . . ." Well is widely identified as a floor-holder, a strategy to

ward off the attempts of listener-participants to capture the floor. Well, therefore, is an acknowledgment by the narrator of the reader's potential turn-taking capability in this fictional imitation of the conversational speech event. The acknowledgment is extended further in the narrator's statement of the same idea three times: "didn't feel them. Not a bit, not an atom. . . ." Repetition of something three times suggests that the narrator thinks the reader is expressing some reservation or that the narrator is expressing some uncertainty about Laura's feelings. Both are true in this case. The ellipses after atom suggest that the narrator is imitating a potential turn-taking episode. That is, the narrator repeats the idea twice and then stops, allowing the reader to throw in his two cents before continuing with the story. In story telling, the narrator has control of the floor until the story is ended, but the narrator may give up the floor now and then for brief comments from listener-reader-participants. Later the reader finds that the repetition is also "protesting too much." Laura does, in fact, feel.

The result of this emotive narrator who allows the appearance of turn-taking here and there is a cooperative reader. The reader, following conversational rules, is from the very beginning willing to give the narrator the benefit of the doubt. Then the narrator shifts her position very slowly and manages to bring about the capturing

of the reader's loyalties in behalf of the main character, Laura. The way the narrator makes the shift is very unusual. First, the narrator is standing outside the characters but imitating the way the characters think.

> But Meg could not possibly go and supervise the men. She had washed her hair before breakfast, and she sat drinking her coffee in a green turban, with a dark wet curl stamped on each cheek. Jose, the butterfly, always came down in a silk petticoat and a kimono jacket.
> "You'll have to go, Laura; you're the artistic one."

The first line is an outside summary. But the summary is in the style which Meg might use inside: could not possibly go. The narrator here is like one of the tellers of children's tales; these narrators tell the stories in a language which imitates the way the children (or the bears) talk and think. Yet the narrator is obviously not a child. The opening line established this point of view: "And after all the weather was ideal." The lilt is very much the kind one hears in the speech of the children in the story, but the next line establishes distance: "They could not have had a more perfect day. . . ." The narrator, therefore, talks about the characters in third person, establishing a separate persona, and at the same time often imitates the style of characters, as conversational story-tellers often do.

Later in the story, the narrator seems to get closer to the inside of Laura's mind: "His smile was so easy, so friendly that Laura recovered. What nice eyes he had,

small, but a dark blue!" The exclamation increases the intensity and the closeness. A few paragraphs later the following section occurs:

> "You're going to have a band, are you?" said another of the workmen. He was pale. He had a haggard look as his dark eyes scanned the tennis-court. What was he thinking?
> "Only a very small band," said Laura gently. Perhaps he wouldn't mind so much if the band was quite small. But the tall fellow interrupted.

"What was he thinking?" and "Perhaps he wouldn't mind so much if the band was quite small" seem to be shared thoughts of Laura and the narrator, the narrator again providing an imitation of what Laura might be thinking. In such cases as "What was he thinking" the reader is pulled between the narrator and Laura. When the line first appears, the workman is in the foreground, and Laura is in the background, not even mentioned in the paragraph. Thus "What was he thinking?" is the narrator stepping in to focus on the young man. But the next sentence from Laura--"only a small band"--sends the reader back to recast "What was he thinking?" as the narrator's best summary of what might have been in Laura's mind.

Finally, on page 9, the narrator moves inside:

> Never had she imagined she could look like that. Is mother right? she thought. And now she hoped her mother was right. Am I being extravagant? Perhaps it was extravagant. Just for a moment she had another glimpse of that poor woman and those little children, and the body being carried into the house. But it all seemed blurred, unreal, like a picture in the newspaper. I'll

> remember it again after the party's over, she decided. And somehow that seemed quite the best plan. . . .

This is the first time that the story has an unquoted "I." The "Am I being extravagant?" is directly inside the mind, and before this "I" is the outside (she imagined, she thought, she hoped) and after this "I" is the outside ("she had another glimpse"). The narrator's stepping directly into Laura's mind and voice does not happen again in the story after this paragraph. But this paragraph is one of the two most crucial paragraphs in the story. In this paragraph, Laura lets the hat and the party blur her memory ("I'll remember it again after the party is over . . ."). In the second most crucial paragraph at the end of the story, Laura apologizes to the peaceful dead man for her hat. In the meantime, the reader has discovered that Laura, who claims to have no feelings about class distinction, feels enough to say "small band" and ease the young workman's feelings and eat her bread and butter in public to declare that "she felt like a work girl." In other words, Laura is sensitive to class distinctions. But the fact that Laura is close to the reader, the fact that the narrator talks like Laura, establishes in the reader a cooperative attitude toward Laura's responses. The narrator accomplishes this by moving closer and closer to Laura. By the end, the reader is willing to give Laura, like a first-person narrator, the benefit of the doubt.

This results from agreeing to the social rule. The intellectual rationale is that Laura's innocence is so overpowering, to the point that the death scene is transformed into a miracle. But to believe this ending, the reader must be prepared to cooperate and not be a harsh judge, thereby following the distancing rules of conversations.

The processing principle contributes to the same interpretation. Reality is presented here in exaggerated terms, suggesting that reality is easily knowable and to some degree obvious, so obvious that one need not be too concerned about whether the language used is exaggerated and inexact. Examples of exaggeration include the following in the opening paragraph:

> As for the roses, you could not help feeling that they understood that roses are the only flowers that impress people at garden parties
>
> and
>
> literally hundreds had come out in a single night; the green bushes bowed down as though they had been visited by archangels

Archangels, roses that understood, literally hundreds--all of these references have more childlike exuberance than careful observation. The same attitude toward reality is repeated in numerous "could not" statements: "couldn't possibly throw it away," "could not have had a more perfect day," "how it got there Mrs. Sheridan could not imagine," and "couldn't look at herself." Of course. the fact is that she could have thrown away the bread and butter, the

day, as it turned out, could have been more perfect, Mrs. Sheridan could imagine, and Laura does look at herself in the mirror.

This kind of childlike description of reality--very much like the blue sky "veiled with a haze of gold" at the opening of the story--confirms the innocence that the reader finds in Laura, the main character, and in the narrator's imitation of what Laura might be thinking. The world is not what it seems in the descriptions and yet the exuberance and the assumption that reality is not all that hard to understand end up representing an innocence to be treasured, at least just a bit.

The many and's at the beginning of sentences--over twenty by rough count--add to the childlike view of reality. In this view all is perfect, all is ideal, all has a golden haze. The and's give this perfection a remarkable sameness, a sameness that makes the garden party and the Sheridan's family life a trifle empty. A "trifle" because the emptiness of their lives does not have tragic proportions, and the and's convey a sameness about it all.

The modeling principles also contribute to the interpretation. The text is projected as a transitory document, something like a draft in Writer-Based Prose (Flower, 1979). First of all, the opening sentence, "And after all the weather was ideal," refers to some other framework in which this conversational story must sit. The

presupposition is that there must have been an ongoing conversation in which this story came up. The story is, then, non-detachable from some such setting. Without such a setting the opening is absurd. Therefore, the story has an underlying conversational framework, and conversations are, by definition, transitory and impermanent.

Second, the text has some indicators that this document has not been completed. First of all, the narrator at several points leaves gaps signaled by ellipses (pages 3, 9, 13). The numerous fragments like "Oh, impossible" at the bottom of page 6, the many questions, and the many exclamations all contribute to a transitory quality about the narrator's presentation. The narrator's apparent first-draft efforts are similar to some of the main character's efforts. The main character has more to say but not enough time at the moment (in the story) to work it out, signaled by such constructions as "The friendliness of it, the --- the --- Just to prove how happy she was . . ." (page 3). This condition continues to the end when Laura is unable to say what life is: "Isn't life," she stammered, "isn't life--." What life is she does not explain, but it does not matter because Laurie "quite understood." The fact that the text is presented to the reader as a transitory document helps underline the fact that the ending of the story is only temporary. Laura will, after all, grow up, and innocence will pass. The

situation at the end must be understood as tentative, in all of its ambiguity.

"Soldier's Home": Prototype of the Report Story[2]

When public pronouncements are made about the decline of literacy, everyone understands that literacy refers to skills in reports and expository texts, not social conversations. One reason for the higher priority for journalistic reports and exposition is that they perform the two main functions of writing, one the storage function and the other the abstraction function (Goody, 1977:78). The abstraction function results from the fact that the written information allows one to manipulate it in various ways, organizing the information first as one pattern and then as another. The primary purpose of reports is storage, not abstraction.

The purpose of reports can be best understood by examining their historical origin as lists. Goody (1977: 79-80) has described the list as one of the earliest forms of institutionalized writing.

> Even in Assyrian times, it [the list] is not the main "stream of tradition," either in the form of literary creations or the recording of myth and folktale, but rather the administrative and economic documents found in temples and palaces

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[2] The page numbers refer to "Soldier's Home," in Short Story Masterpieces, ed. Robert Penn Warren and Albert Erskine (Dell, 1964).

> throughout Babylonia. . . . [I]n the early phases of written cultures in the first fifteen hundred years of man's documented history, such materials are often presented in a form which is very different from that of ordinary speech, indeed of almost any speech. And the most characteristic form is something that rarely occurs in oral discourse at all (though it sometimes appears in ritual), namely the list.

Goody (1977:81-85) outlines the following characteristics of lists: (1) discontinuity rather than continuity; (2) stress on naming and locating; and, (3) chronological order in administrative lists and indifferent order in other lists ("it can be read in different directions"). Some of Goody's characteristics appear in some of the features for report speech events: (1) distancing features in which the third-person narrator gives "just the facts" and refuses to speculate and in which the reader refuses to cooperate and does speculate about meaning, although accepting the facts as given; (2) processing features in which the transitions or absence thereof suggest a world with discontinuity and in which the verbs suggest a world in which things happen to people, not people doing something to things; and, (3) modeling in which the factual record is permanent but the ideas remain unstated and, therefore, transitory.

The implied author of "The Garden Party" is a stenographer or recorder who simply writes down what the narrator says. The narrator, as one could tell, has had some experience as a story teller, probably reading children's

tales to children or adults. In reports, the implied author plays the role of the narrator. In "Soldier's Home," this implied author-narrator is a reporter who is "just after the facts, ma'am." We know this narrator has reviewed some documents which still exist in the world somewhere: "There is a picture which shows him among his fraternity brothers" and "There is a picture which shows him on the Rhine." We know the narrator has interviewed Krebs, possibly the mother, and not the father and sister, and has possibly visited the town. The report that is presented comes from a narrator who does not present Krebs' thoughts directly or the narrator's personal thoughts. The only part where Krebs' direct thoughts may appear is at the end of the story: "Well, that was all over now, anyway. He would go over to the schoolyard and watch Helen play indoors." The "Well, that was all over now, anyway" is either what Krebs is directly thinking or what the narrator says. This single casual note helps to release the tension that has built up in the previous scene.

Except for this one instance, the point of view is detached. In the story "people seemed to think it was rather ridiculous," leaving room for the factual uncertainties, and in the picture, "Krebs and the corporal look too big for their uniforms," again leaving room for the factual uncertainties one cannot determine by a detached look at a picture.

One comment about the use of "you." "You" in "Soldier's Home" is used not as a pronoun of direct address but as a generalized noun meaning people in general: "You couldn't talk much" ("People couldn't talk much") and "You did not need a girl" ("Men did not need a girl"). Finally, the narrator presents the report as if it might be detached from time. For instance, in "Now, after the war, it was still the same car" and "That was all over now," the time seems immediate ("Now"), and yet events are in the past. Hamburger (1973:80) has called this use of now a fictional tense which detaches time from real time or an actual past. In any event, the language adds to the narrator's already established detachment.

The attitude toward reality in "Soldier's Home" confirms the narrator's detachment. The verbs constantly suggest that man is not an intentional being who thinks, makes plans, and then acts to carry out goals. Instead, things seem to happen to man: "Later he felt the need," "he found that to be listened to," "a distaste . . . set in," "Krebs acquired the nausea in regard to experience," and "Krebs did not feel the energy." These happenings tend to disengage man from life, to diminish one's sense of involvement.

But attempts at involvement lead to disillusionment. With friends Krebs must lie to get their interest, and with girls there was "intrigue," "politics," and again "lies."

For Krebs "it was all too complicated," and the point of life is to keep things simple. The sequence of events in the story begins with discontinuity and moves toward detachment. The discontinuity is shown in the fact that Krebs, who enlisted, came home too late for a welcome, but the draftees "had all been welcomed elaborately." Another example is the fact "Krebs went to war from a Methodist college in Kansas," a radical jump in time and place, yet he and his fraternity brothers in Kansas were wearing a kind of uniform ("exactly the same height and style collar"). And finally, as another failure of coherence, there is the picture which shows Krebs on the Rhine with two German girls and another corporal: "Krebs and the corporal look too big for their uniforms. The German girls are not beautiful. The Rhine does not show in the picture."

Then follows a sequence of detachment on the part of the main character: first no talking to friends and girls ("But he would not go through all the talking"); next no working ("Vaguely he wanted a girl but he did not want to have to work to get her"); then no thinking ("You did not have to think about it. Sooner or later it would come"); and finally maybe only qualified love:

"Am I really your girl?"

"Sure."

"Do you love me?"

"Uh, huh."

"Will you love me always?"

"Sure."

"Will you come over and watch me play indoor?"

"Maybe."

The detachment of the character from other characters in the narrative is reinforced by the detachment between the implied narrator and the implied reader and between the implied narrator and the events being reported in the underlying speech event. The report form, using as it does some of the features of a list, helps project a world of discontinuity and an indifference toward the order of events.

Another processing feature of report speech events is the frequent use of and, adding a sameness to the listing of facts and avoiding the editorial comment inherent in transitions which provide cause-effect relationships or subordination of one idea to another. In "The Garden Party," these same and's seem childlike in their removal of cause-effect relationships. The selection on page 97 from "Soldier's Home" illustrates the lack of connectives: "Now he would have liked. . . . But here at home it was. . . . He knew. . . . It was. . . . That was. . . . There was. . . ." Mark Schorer (1950:426), commenting on Hemmingway's "A Clean, Well Lighted Place, has noted that in Hemingway the frequent use of and conveys a sense of a world without value. That is, because and is a

coordinating conjunction connecting equals, everything becomes equal and this results in nothing having value. In "Soldier's Home," the and's and absence of connectives signal a world without connections, without cause-effect relationships, and possibly without values.

Because report speech events are not idiomatic, the conversational rules of cooperation are not evoked. The reader, therefore, is uncooperative. In fictional narrative, however, although the reader can be suspicious of the facts, the reader cannot challenge the facts as he could in the case of non-fictional discourse. The reader, therefore, is uncooperative with the narrator on issues of speculation and ideas. However, the narrator of the report speech event refuses to speculate. He tells us that Krebs acquired "the nausea in regard to experience that is the result of untruth or exaggeration." The narrator then shows us that dishonesty and exaggeration result from talking. The refuge for Krebs (and the narrator) when it comes to reading about the war is "more maps." The maps present the facts of names and locations, without the speculations and the explanations. But the uncooperative reader of "Soldier's Home" keeps insisting "What does it all mean?" And when the narrator answers only with a code of silence on such matters, the reader begins to make uncooperative, private speculations, looking for the hypothesis which gives context and background for the events.

The modeling principles for reports have, as Goody indicated earlier, been established in social usage. Unlike social notes (conversations) which should be thrown away, reports should be used for storage of facts. The text is a permanent document in reports, but the text in reports does not have the importance and authority attributed to expository texts. Reports serve administrative functions, but they do not become national treasures. Reports are fragments out of time, sometimes ending with what appears to be inconclusive events. But expository texts attempt global perspectives, identifying conceptual universals in human experience.

The author of "Soldier's Home" had a rather difficult challenge: how does one write a story about why one should not talk and not think too much. The very existence of the story, words on the page, is testimony to the value and power of talk, and no author-narrator can insist explicitly that this story was not thought about. Readers will assume that the existence of the story means the author-narrator did some thinking.

One way out of the inconsistency is to write a conversational story. This form has a text which is transitory. Therefore, the reader will know that, even though the author-narrator is using words to say that words do not work, the text is a throwaway and, therefore, the author-narrator can have his cake and eat it too--can use

words to say that words do not work and use a throwaway form so that the reader will know that the author-narrator is not taking his words to be "permanent."

The problem with the conversational form is that the narrator of the form has a close relationship with the implied reader, and this kind of distancing is inconsistent with the theme of detachment in "Soldier's Home." The author cannot select exposition or formal lectures because they have a text which is even more permanent and clothed with authority. The report, then, a mid-point on the continuum from transitory to very permanent, is the only choice. It is a form that provides detachment from the implied reader and the textual permanence necessary for the storage of facts, but not the authority and significant permanence accorded exposition.

"Barn Burning": Prototype Exposition,
One Type of Formal History[3]

Formal exposition differs from reports and conversational stories in the three characteristics of speech events: (1) increased detachment (distancing); (2) increased subordination (processing); and, (3) increased permanence and authority of text (modeling).

The exposition has a narrator who is even more

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[3] The page numbers refer to "Barn Burning," in Short Story Masterpieces, ed. Robert Penn Warren and Albert Erskine (Dell, 1964).

detached than that found in reports because the history narrator can step outside the framework of the events in the story and generalize about human beings over large selections of time and space. For instance, the narrator in "Barn Burning" can move forward in time twenty years: "Later, twenty years later, he was to tell himself" (p. 167). Or more: "It was exactly the same quality which in later years would cause his descendants to over-run the engine before putting a motor car in motion" (p. 165). The fact that the narrator and reader are so detached that they develop explicitly different views has been discussed on pages 20 to 25.

The narrator can also move back from events and generalize about people: "There was something about his wolflike independence and even courage . . . which impressed people." Or move inside characters: "The hermetic meat which his intestines believed he smelled coming in intermittent gusts momentary and brief between the other constant one" (p. 62). Even into the mind: "Hit's big as a Courthouse, he thought," the "he thought" maintaining the narrator's detachment from first-person.

Like the narrator of reports, the narrator of exposition can also detach the story from "real time," establishing in Hamburger's terms (1973:80) fictional time: "And now the boy saw the prints. . . ." The now is immediate and yet the time is past, as noted earlier in "Soldier's

Home."

The reader's position - one of uncooperativeness on both facts and explanations, has been outlined earlier on pages 20 to 25. One comment on facts. The reader knows that the father is being presented as a barn burner, but the reader also knows that the detached narrator, who is speculating about events, may not have observed the act. Therefore, the fact of the father being a barn burner is questioned by the reader almost until the very end.

The processing strategy in formal exposition is the building of hierarchies. This is best accomplished with subordinators (which, if) and additions of the Francis Christensen variety--appositives, participles, adjectives after the noun (Christensen, 1973). The following chart shows the frequency count (total markers divided by total words) of emotive approximations and connotive/definitiveness in the three stories thus far discussed:

	Emotive (You)	vs. Impersonal (detached)
	Approximations (sort of)	vs. Explanations (which, ing, if)
"The Garden Party"	.05 (Mainly Emotive)	.01
"Soldier's Home"	.06 (Mainly Approximation)	.02
"Barn Burning"	.03 (Mainly Approximation)	.07

The text characteristics of "Barn Burning" have already been indicated. The text is detachable from time

and located in a fictional time (Hamburger, 1973). That is, now in "And now the boy saw. . ." refers to a past fictional time, not a present now. The now has been detached from the present to which it usually refers and placed in a past. Second, generalization can be moved from the setting where evidence was collected and placed in hypothetical situations. Furthermore, the text in "Barn Burning" is one of authority and permanence. All of these qualities--narrator, reader, connectives, and text--confirm interpretations stressing the universals of family and blood and the fact that history is both the source of one's pride (family and blood above all) and the source of one's burden (past reputation) and present condition (the sharecropper as modern slave).

In summary, the dominant features of the three prototypes are as follows:

	Distancing		Processing		Modeling	
			Approximations	Definitions	Permanent	Transitory
	Close	Far	Joiners (and's)	Embedders (if)	Clear	Opaque
"Garden Party" (Conversation)	X		X			X
"Soldier's Home" (Report)		X	X		X	
"Barn Burning" (Lecture/ Exposition)		X		X	X	

The projected roles and participants in each speech event are as follows:

Conversations

Writer: Stenographer
Recorder

World: Approximate
Loosely constructed

Text: Transitory and impermanent
Social taboo against public sharing of text

Narrator: Conversational partner
Sharing burden of communication and expression

Reader: Conversational partner
Cooperatively sharing burden of communication and expression

Reports

Writer: Playing role of narrator (may be same or different values)

World: Factually certain
Ideologically uncertain or not immediately visible to the uneducated eye

Text: Archive of fact
No storage of ideas

Narrator: Reporter or detective
Fact collector and distributor

Reader: Accepts facts
Speculates on generalizations and overall meaning

Expositions

Writer: Plays role of narrator

World: Rational
Logically ordered
Complex
Hierarchical
Hard to know

Text: Archive of ideas supported by facts
A monument to man's eternal rationality

Narrator: Authority figure
Generalizer about ideas based on itemized facts

Reader: Critic of ideas and estimator of weights and validity of facts

In the next section, speech event theory will be tested as a possible explanation of reading problems encountered by inexperienced readers.

From "The Garden Party" by Katherine Mansfield

And after all the weather was ideal. They could not have had a more perfect day for a garden-party if they had ordered it. Windless, warm, the sky without a cloud. Only the blue was veiled with a haze of light gold, as it is sometimes in early summer. The gardener had been up since dawn, mowing the lawns and sweeping them, until the grass and the dark flat rosettes where the daisy plants had been seemed to shine. As for the roses, you could not help feeling they understood that roses are the only flowers that impress people at garden-parties; the only flowers that everybody is certain of knowing. Hundreds, yes, literally hundreds, had come out in a single night; the green bushes bowed down as though they had been visited by archangels.

From "Soldier's Home" by Ernest Hemingway

Krebs went to the war from a Methodist college in Kansas. There is a picture which shows him among his fraternity brothers, all of them wearing exactly the same height and style collar. He enlisted in the Marines in 1917 and did not return to the United States until the second division returned from the Rhine in the summer of 1919.

There is a picture which shows him on the Rhine with two German girls and another corporal. Krebs and the corporal look too big for their uniforms. The German girls are not beautiful. The Rhine does not show in the picture.

. . .

Now he would have liked a girl if she had come to him and not wanted to talk. But here at home it was all too complicated. He knew he could never get through it all again. It was not worth the trouble. That was the thing about French girls and German girls. There was not all this talking. You couldn't talk much and you did not need to talk. It was simple and you were friends.

From "Barn Burning" by William Faulkner

The store in which the Justice of Peace's court was sitting smelled of cheese. The boy, crouched on his nail keg at the back of the crowded room, knew he smelled cheese, shelves close-packed with the solid, squat, dynamic shapes of tin cans whose labels his stomach read, not from the lettering which meant nothing to his mind but from the

scarlet devils and the silver curve of fish--this, the cheese which he knew he smelled and the hermetic meat which his intestines believed he smelled coming in intermittent gusts momentary and brief between the other constant one, the smell and sense just a little of fear because mostly of despair and grief, the old fierce pull of blood. He could not see the table where the Justice sat and before which his father and his father's enemy (our enemy he thought in that despair; ourn! mine and hisn both! He's my father!) stood, but he could hear them, the two of them that is, because his father had said no word yet. . . .

IV. THE MISREADING OF STORIES

The intuitionist views reading as a process by which readers discover meaning in themselves. The structuralist argues that reading is a process by which readers match texts to public conventions.

The positions of some intuitionists and the structuralists present a problem for a theory of texts. Both seem right and wrong. The intuitionist is right in claiming that different readings of a text can both be "true" and that a writer can use language to discover personal intuitions, leading to the possibility that a given word can lead different writers to different meanings. But the intuitionist is wrong to claim that all meaning is <u>in</u> the reader or <u>in</u> the writer and not at all <u>in</u> the public conventions which make language an instrument of communication. If the intuitionist were right, there would be no need to revise interpretations. One interpretation would be as good as another.

The structuralist claims, on the other hand, that language is a system of rules and conventions, the form of which produces an epiphenomenon called meaning. This congruence between form and meaning is the positivist basis for deciding which interpretations are reasonable and

which are not. But the positivist is clearly wrong to claim that all meaning is determined by the given rules of public convention. If the positivist were right, it would not be possible for a reader or writer to violate or to amend the rules of public convention and still communicate with other people. Only one interpretation would be possible, and no respectable writer would break with public conventions.

E.D. Hirsch, Jr. (1976) has suggested that Piaget's theory of corrigible schemata is a way out of the inconsistencies between the intuitionist and the positivist. In Piaget's theory, a schema establishes a range of predictions or expectations which, if fulfilled by sensory information, confirm the schema, an act of assimilation, and if not fulfilled, cause us to change the schema, an act of accommodation. E. H. Gombrich, writing about perception in art, describes information processing in terms very close to Piaget's:

> All culture and communication depend on interplay between expectation and observation, the waves of fulfillment, disappointment, right guesses, wrong moves that make up our daily life. . . . (p. 60) Without some starting point, some initial scheme, we could never get hold of the flux of experience. Without categories, we could not sort out our impressions. (Gombrich, 1960:88)

The schema can represent a set of rules or conventions which can be changed (accommodation) when the individual finds that these rules or conventions do not match the

information available. In assimilation the individual deals with a text in terms of given structures. Both assimilation and accommodation are simultaneously present in every act. Major as well as minor changes (or accommodations) in conventions appear to occur slowly (Simpson, 1963:104), and experimentation is particularly noticeable among the young (Ginsburg and Opper, 1969:61). Thus, Piaget's theory provides for both intuition and determinism. Says Hirsch, "For theory of interpretation, the potential importance of this psychological-cognitive model is beyond estimate" (Hirsch, 1976:33). In a Piagetian perspective, two kinds of reading problems occur, those that result from readers failing to apply the normal rules of speech events (assimilation) and those that result from the failure of readers to modify the rules of speech events to fit boundary cases.

Assimilation: Following the Rules

The misreading discussed in this section will be primarily the result of problems of assimilation. That is, the readers do not know the conventions of the underlying speech events or do not recognize that fictional narrative has an underlying speech event. For instance, the young reader who says, "I don't like Hemingway because he never tells me the reason for anything," is saying either "I do not wish to be the reader Hemingway wants me to be" or "I do not understand that when I play the role of Hemingway's

reader, I am not allowed to ask the narrator to explain anything and must explain things to myself."

Five misreadings of this type will be examined.

The Misreading of Fact Without Context

Such misreadings are not restricted to young readers. One example is the list of questions which follow Hemingway's "Big Two Hearted River" in a high school literature anthology:

> Identifying Style
>
> 1. In the use of words: in the passage on the buckwheat cakes (page 102), find examples of single words which communicate particularly well Hemingway's meaning. Are they action words, primarily, or naming words? (Verbs or nouns?) Are they long or short words? (Consider as long words any which have more than three syllables.) Check this passage against several other passages of similar length in the story. Is the passage typical or exceptional?
> 2. In the use of sentences: in the passage about the huge trout Nick loses (page 105), find examples of long and short sentences. Are there more or fewer short sentences than you would expect to find in other writers? For an example of nineteenth-century writing of the kind Hemingway rejects, turn to "The Bishop's Candlesticks" (page 57) and study the paragraph beginning "Nature at times blends her effects and spectacles with our actions . . . reflect." What differences do you note between the two styles of writing?
> 3. In the use of paragraphs: compare the length of Hemingway's paragraphs with those in "The Bishop's Candlesticks" which do not contain conversation. Does this comparison support what you have already noticed about Hemingway's style?
> 4. In the emphasis upon physical sensation: can you find examples of writing that conveys to you how something looked or sounded or felt?
> 5. In the emphasis upon actions and objects rather than thoughts: does Hemingway spend more

> time on Nick's thoughts or on what Nick does? What are some of the objects in Nick's surroundings that Hemingway takes time to feature? Do Nick's thoughts receive a similar amount of attention?

This list of questions leads the young reader to the conclusion that Hemingway's style focuses on actions, objects, and physical sensations, not thoughts, and that the reader is expected to celebrate the physical sensation of how things look, sound, or feel. In the beginning, Hemingway's implied reader is expected to have a trusting or accepting attitude toward the facts and a questioning attitude toward meaning. But the distance between the narrator and the implied reader soon changes the implied reader to one who accepts the facts as stated but is uncooperative about meaning. That is, the implied reader begins to theorize about the meaning of the facts despite the narrator's insistence that one attend to the facts alone. As a result, "Big Two Hearted River" is both a story about the sensations of fishing, the facts themselves, and a story about Nick's effort to escape from the problems or big questions of life. But what are these big questions or problems? The answer to these questions is in the other stories surrounding "Big Two Hearted River"--all under the title In Our Time. In other words, "Big Two Hearted River" is not a short story which can be separated from its context within In Our Time. If the reader does not understand that the experience of World War I hangs in

the background, he will not understand what Nick is trying to escape from or avoid. Then "Big Two Hearted River" is misread as only a story which gives good physical details. The same problem does not occur with "Soldier's Home," a story out of the same collection, because that story establishes the background of the war and family pressures.

Misreading the Narrator as Unchanging

The reading of Camus' The Stranger presents a similar but different problem for young readers. That is, when young readers first read Hemingway, they expect the detached narrator to present an archival world in which there are facts and theories. What they find is the world of the modern Zero Degree writing in which the narrator refuses to theorize. The young readers must learn to search for theories for themselves, accepting the facts as facts. The young readers of The Stranger encounter the close narrator of the conversational world. They expect to cooperate with this reader in the usual manner, filling and adding where necessary to create the expected event in which reality is approximate and mutually constructed by both reader and narrator. This event involves, among other things, the conversational rules which allow overstatements, emotive phrasings. We know that "madman stuff" and "some advice I've been turning over in my mind ever since" (p. 17) are not to be taken literally. That is, in the world of approximations, the reader translates "madman stuff"

into "kind of odd" and "ever since" into "off and on ever since."

The problem in The Stranger is that the narrator uses emotive overstatement only with physical sensations. In matters like love, the narrator takes a neutral, detached position. The following selections illustrate the point:

> I told Marie about the old man's habits, and it made her laugh. She was wearing my pajama suits, and had the sleeves rolled up. When she laughed, I wanted her again. A moment later she asked me if I loved her. I said that sort of question had no meaning, really; but I supposed I didn't. She looked sad for a bit, but when we were getting our lunch ready she brightened up and started laughing, and when she laughs I always want to kiss her. (p. 44)

> Marie came that evening and asked me if I'd marry her. I said I didn't mind; if she was keen on it, we'd get married. Then she asked me if I loved her. I replied much as before that her question meant nothing or next to nothing--but I supposed I didn't. "If that's how you feel," she said, "why marry me?" I explained that it had no importance really, but if it would give her pleasure, we could get married right away. (p. 53)

> Before we came to the end of it, the sea was in full view; it lay smooth as a mirror, and in the distance a big headland jutted out over its black reflection. Through the air came the faint buzz of a motor engine and we saw a fishing boat very far out, gliding almost imperceptibly across the dazzling smoothness. . . . Then everything began to reel before my eyes, a fiery gust came from the sea, while the sky cracked in two, from end to end, and a great sheet of flame poured through the rift. Every nerve in my body was a steel spring, and my grip closed on the revolver. The trigger gave, and the smooth underbelly of the butt jogged my palm. (p. 76)

For physical sensations, we have the narrator wanting to kiss Marie when he hears her laugh, describing the sea

as a smooth mirror and as the dazzling smoothness, and describing the sensations of the moment when there is "a fiery gust" while "the sky cracked in two and a great sheet of flame poured through the rift." The narrator's emotive responses result from physical sensations of hearing, touch, smell, and sight, sometimes expressed in figurative language or overstatement which the reader is not expected to take literally. The reader is not, for instance, expected to conclude that the sky has literally cracked in two. The reader is expected, in the cooperative fashion, to provide a reinterpretation.

In most conversational situations, the reader is given some latitude in his cooperative filling and adding. But young readers have difficulty with The Stranger. They expect to add and fill in as part of their cooperative role. Yet the narrator actively resists any efforts to add any level of meaning beyond the physical sensation. He resists questions of love, marriage (beyond the pleasure principle), and personal responsibility. The second problem is that the reader misreads the narrator as static. Narrators can change. At the end, the narrator relieves the reader's frustration at being denied one part of the role of adding and filling; the narrator begins his change by admitting he has denied regrets: "I have never been able to regret anything at all in my life. I've always been far too much absorbed in the present moment" (p. 127). At

the end, finally, the narrator has changed and emotive language in the area of meaning and philosophy comes forth:

> I told him not to waste his rotten prayers on me. . . . Living as he did, like a corpse, he couldn't even be sure of being alive. It might look as if my hands were empty. Actually I was sure of myself, sure about everything, far surer than he. . . . (p. 151)

The young readers who hate the narrator of The Stranger are reading the story correctly. That is, these young readers are applying the agreements of the conversational world and finding some of those agreements violated in the first two-thirds of the book. This violation establishes an antagonism between the beginning reader and narrator, an antagonism that is resolved in the final third of the book. The problem young readers face is whether to keep reading when one does not like the narrator. A possible solution is to recognize that narrator change is possible. The style typologies could help the young readers understand why they hate the narrator and how the antagonism between reader and narrator could be resolved. The purpose of continuing to read is to see whether the other half of the cooperative principle--the half pertaining to meaning and love--is reinstated in the narrator's perspective. As a matter of fact, the turning point in The Stranger comes suddenly: ". . . I felt as if I hadn't for ages. I had a foolish desire to burst into tears. For the first time I realized how all these people loathed me" (p. 112). The conclusion one might reach is that, without an implicit understanding

of the conversational world, its agreements and views, The Stranger could not exist as form. The form depends on the tension between the conversational world and the violations thereof.

The early violations of the conversational world's cooperative meaning moves The Stranger close to one of the agreements in the factual world, the agreement that the narrator will focus on fact alone and ignore interpretative meaning, particularly speculative issues like love and the purpose of life. But The Stranger remains a boundary example of the conversational world; it never becomes an example of the factual world. For one thing, the narrator in a Hemingway story could never give the kind of speech that appears at the end of The Stranger. This speech turns the celebration of fact into philosophical purpose. A Hemingway narrator would never talk that much on such a theoretical subject.

Misreading Distance

An example of misreading the distance and thus the speech event of a text is the case in which the reader is a third party overhearing a conversation between a narrator and somebody else or reading a letter/diary/journal intended for someone else's reading. This problem occurs for young readers in reading Wuthering Heights.

The reader is reading a diary or journal which the

author, Lockwood, has apparently written for himself during a stay in the country. Lockwood is himself reporting what he has been told by Nelly Dean, Joseph, Isabella, Zillah, and others:



The reader in this case is overhearing information intended for someone else. Because the reader is an indirect participant in the exchange, the reader is not totally bound by all the rules of cooperation. For instance, Lockwood reports the following information about Heathcliff and Catherine I:

> Heathcliff had knelt on one knee to embrace her; he attempted to rise, but she seized his hair and kept him down . . . "Don't torture me till I'm mad as yourself," cried he, wrenching his head free and grinding his teeth. The two, to a cool spectator, made a strange and fearful picture. Well might Catherine dream that heaven be a land of exile to her, unless with her mortal body she cast away her mortal character also. Her present countenance had a wild vindictiveness in its white cheek, and a bloodless lip, and a scintillating eye; and she retained in her closed fingers a portion of the locks she had been grasping. As to her companion, while raising himself with one hand, he had taken her arm with the other; and so inadequate was his stock of gentleness to the requirements of her condition, that on his letting go I saw four distinct impressions left blue in the colourless skin. (pp. 155-156)

> He dashed his head against the knotted trunk, and lifting up his eyes, howled not like a man, but like a savage beast getting goaded to death with knives and spears. . . . (p. 164)

The reader also knows a number of things about the character and personality of the people who are reporting the story: (1) Lockwood is highly conventional, shocked by nude statues above the door of Wuthering Heights; (2) Nelly is conventional and moralistic, always giving the children advice about behaving themselves; (3) Zillah is a bit mysterious; (4) Joseph seems a bit odd, his language being the hardest to understand; and, (5) Isabella is a spoiled child, irresponsible, romantic, and highly emotional in her responses. As Schorer (1948) has indicated, the reader must view the facts of the story through the minds of these mediators. The following are a few of the possible responses to the scene in which Catherine seizes Heathcliff's head in her hand and pulls out a few locks when Heathcliff stands up:

READER AGREEMENT	READER CONCLUSIONS
Cooperative	She does have locks in her hand but "seize" is only an approximation.
Conversational Event	She was holding his head.
	She held on when he got up.
Uncooperative	She did not have locks in her hand. No supporting evidence that Catherine is that deranged. Some evidence that Nelly is unreliable, including problem of remembering an event several years later.
Lecture/Expository Event	

Semi-Cooperative . . . . . Reader gets information second hand (narrator reports what someone else says) and gets information indirectly (reads diary intended for someone else)	Catherine held Heathcliff's head, and when H. stood up, a few loose hairs were left in Catherine's hand. She looked at them and closed her fingers around them, drawing attention to her emotional response to Heathcliff. Catherine is capable of a little drama now and then, and Nelly's views need revision.

Young readers have a number of problems with Wuthering Heights. Some cooperate too much and believe everything Lockwood says. These readers, believing that Heathcliff did vigorously bang his head against a tree and howl like a savage beast, consider the general situation to be a madhouse. Another group of readers are very uncooperative. They believe that Catherine and Heathcliff should get married and live happily ever after. These readers suffer from the problem of sentimentality, which I. A. Richards ascribes to inhibitions: ". . . sentimental fixations and distortions of feelings are the result of inhibitions. . . . If a man can only think of his childhood as a lost heaven, it is probably because he is afraid to think of the other aspects" (Richards, 1929:252). These readers want to ignore everything that Lockwood and his commentators say. The reader of Wuthering Heights must strive for a semi-cooperative position, playing the role of one overhearing a conversation. Lockwood is not to be literally believed. Some toning down is necessary. Some meaning must be revised. However, disbelieving Lockwood entirely

is not allowed. In fact, the story ends with peace and order restored when Heathcliff dies, and Cathy II, domesticated by Edgar and Thrushcross Grange, marries Hareton. The world of peace in Wuthering Heights has moved the mood closer to Lockwood's values than to Heathcliff's.

Schorer (1948) makes a similar point about the attitude of the author. The author begins with Lockwood as a cover, a front to tell a story about two positive characters, Catherine I and Heathcliff. But while using Lockwood's voice, the author discovers the truth of some part of Lockwood's position and begins to reverse the direction of the plot, killing off Catherine I, moving Heathcliff toward the background, and bringing forward Cathy II and Hareton. In this way, the technique of telling the story becomes for the author an instrument of discovery about the material. Could it be that the author may have changed because, at least in part, the author on reading the material found she had to be semi-cooperative with Lockwood?

Misreading Choice

Another example of misreading is the assumption that only one view can be right. Sometimes the reader adopts a perspective different from that of the narrator and maybe the characters, and sometimes the reader must recognize that his own perspective is either wrong or, in its own way, limited. This is the problem, for instance, at the

end of "Barn Burning." The reader knows that his admiration of the father results from the father's fierce pride, which needs no defense, and yet the reader knows that the narrator is right about the father's past and the boy is right about the father's barn burning present. Each view is to some extent right. Each view alone is wrong. The misreading here is that young readers are often anxious to select among perspectives, not to live with the ambiguity of several.

A similar problem occurs in Kafka's "The Metamorphosis." Gregor Samsa awakes and finds he is an insect. When Gregor does not come out of his room, the family tries a number of rational procedures, including calling a doctor and a locksmith. Eventually Gregor comes out of his room, but no amount of rational inquiry will correct Gregor's vermin condition. At this point in the story, the reader has been introduced to a report speech event with two different perspectives. First, there is the perspective of the narrator who plays the role of reporter of objective fact. But this narrator is slightly different from the one found in "Soldier's Home." This narrator stations himself alternatively outside Gregor and then inside Gregor throughout the story. In "Soldier's Home" the inside position is only assumed briefly at the end. Thus, in "The Metamorphosis," the narrator opens with the outside position--"When Gregor Samsa awoke one morning

from a troubled dream, he found himself changed into some kind of monstrous vermin"--and later moves inside--"Why did she not go to the others? . . . And why did she weep? . . . These were misplaced troubles!" But, like all report events, the narrator refuses to speculate about the meaning of what has happened.

The narrator's perspective is consistently factual and objective. Various critics have described this perspective as "matter-of-factness," "absolute precision," "complete honesty," "scrupulcus care," "empirical," and "an almost scientific lucidity" (Gray, 1972; Camus, 1962). The second perspective of the family, on the other hand, is almost hysterical, each member of the family expressing emotional concern about Gregor's condition. The reader's initial response to these two perspectives, as is the case in typical report speech events, is "What does it all mean?"

The text of the story is divided into three sections. By the end of the first section, the family has started to turn away from Gregor, the father using a stick to drive Gregor back into his room. By the end of the second section, the family has attempted to detach itself completely from Gregor, the father bombarding Gregor with apples. The sister and mother are still hesitant in their attitudes, but near the end of the third section the sister and the mother are agreeing to ignore Gregor, and the family has

started talking about Gregor as an "it," not a "he." The sister, in fact, says, "We must find a way of getting rid of it." And when Gregor comes out of his room for the last time, the family hardly pays any attention.

This shift in family attitudes from concern to detachment is accompanied by a shift on the part of the reader from questioning to concern. The reader, refusing to cooperate with the narrator's code of no speculation, guesses that the meaning of the story is in the family's mistreatment of Gregor. As the family gets more detached, as the narrator's objective facts about Gregor accumulate, the reader becomes an advocate for Gregor's hope that Gregor can rejoin his family. The added perspective of the charwoman intensifies the reader's advocacy of Gregor's humanity. The charwoman says aloud all the time what the family usually is thinking privately. She calls to Gregor, "Hey, look at the old cockroach," and at the end she announces, "Well, you needn't worry about getting rid of that thing in there. I have fixed it already." When she tries to tell more, the father stops her.

The reader then has an attitude that differs from the perspectives of both the family and the narrator:

Narrator: Gregor's situation is an empirical fact, an instance of the human condition, not to be judged one way or another by outside observers.	Reader: Gregor's situation represents the horror of the human condition, humanity trapped inside an insect-like existence, ignored by family and friends, maintaining hope until the end.

> Gregor's Family: Gregor makes sounds like an insect, looks like an insect, lives like an insect (his room is filthy), and drives away lodgers and acquaintances just as any insect would. Because Gregor meets so many empirical tests for insects, he should be judged as an insect and discarded from our lives as any insect would be.

Then very swiftly comes the conclusion. While the family heads for a picnic, a new activity, the mother and father notice that the daughter is growing up, is physically changing. She does not look the same anymore. The mother and father celebrate this fact: "the daughter's gestures were a confirmation of those new dreams of theirs, an encouragement of their good intentions, when, at the end of the journey, the girl rose before them and stretched her young body."

The reader at the very end finds himself with two possible speculations, either his former view that Gregor's humanity must be defended and hoped for at all costs or the family view that hope resides only in the acceptance and celebration of change and in the practical accommodation to the empirical facts of existence, not in speculations about the internal spirit of humanity. Neither view is that of the narrator. The differences of these two perspectives can be observed in the comments of critics: (1) "the story ends with a moving picture of the family restored to life and health, a picture touched with smiling irony, it is true, but not unrelated to Miranda's

perception of the brave new world" (Gray, 1962:6); and (2) "When, at the end, the story opens up for the first time into the outside world, and Gregor's relations take a ride into the country, we see symbolically how life turns away from the burdensome interruption and returns with relief to its vulgar self affirmation . . . a conclusion of merciless, not to say cynical, coldness which seems to leave us in a region completely undefined and undefinable" (Pfeiffer, 1962:56). Gray emphasizes the family's views, and Pfeiffer emphasizes the reader's former views.

At the end, it seems to me, the reader must maintain both his former view of Gregor's trapped humanity and the family view that Gregor is not Gregor anymore, just as the physical change in the daughter shows that the daughter is not the same. The reader, it seems to me, must accept the absurdity of his position, absurd because to maintain that Gregor is still human is to deny the empirical facts of everyday life, the practical necessities by which people live, and yet not absurd because the reader knows that Gregor does, in some sense, think. The misreading here is that readers are often anxious to select among perspectives, not live with the ambiguity of several. Both the reader's formal views and the family view at the end are right. Each view alone is wrong.

Misreading Boredom

The last problem of misreading is the misunderstanding

of boredom. There are two kinds of boredom. The first results from the fact that Zero Degree writing is intended to some extent to be boring. That is, the fact is all, and issues of meaning and purpose are ignored. As a result, nothing happens except events in Zero Degree writing. The first kind of boredom results from the reader's failure to do what the narrator says to do--speculate. To a large degree, this is part of the initial introduction of the event of Zero Degree writing. It is, in other words, intentional. The second kind of boredom is reader miscalculation. It results from the fact that young readers think they are supposed to read reports the way they read conversations. Barthes has called this problem tmesis: "We do not read everything with the same intensity of reading" (Barthes, 1975:10). There are many kinds of reading, among them fast and slow, skipping and not skipping. Says Barthes,

> . . . our very avidity for knowledge impels us to skim or to skip certain passages (anticipated as "boring") in order to get more quickly to the warmer parts of the anecdote . . . we boldly skip descriptions, explanations, analyses, conversations . . . it is the very rhythm of what is read and what is not read that creates the pleasure of the great narratives: has anyone ever read Proust, Balzac, War and Peace, word for word? (p. 11)

But not all texts are supposed to read in the same way, says Barthes: "Read slowly, read all of a novel by Zola, and the book will drop from your hands; read fast, in snatches, some modern text, and it becomes opaque,

inaccessible to your pleasure: you want something to happen and nothing does." For Barthes the meaning of the modern text or Zero Degree writing is not "the winnowing out of truths but the layering of significance." In other words, the reader of reports reads the facts slowly in order to develop the thesis or speculation which is not in the text. But one reads conversational or archival texts at a faster rate, winnowing out the truths.

An example of the problem is the young reader's experience with Shirley Jackson's "The Lottery," which has all the characteristics of Zero Degree writing: (1) third-person, detached narrator; (2) no statement of overview, thesis, point, or cause-effect relationships; (3) heavy emphasis on factual data such as frequency counts, dates and time, lists of things; and, (4) repetitious structure, particularly the use of and and but as connectives. Young readers often do not finish the story, complaining that it is "boring." Some of those who do finish exclaim "What happened!?" Their response is quite different from the response of readers who finish Hemingway's "Soldier's Home" and exclaim "So what!?" The difference in response results from two different endings: the boredom of "The Lottery" is suddenly reversed in the last few sentences in which the townspeople suddenly turn on Tessie and start stoning her to death, but in "Soldier's Home" the reader's boredom is confirmed. In Hemingway, the problem is that nothing

must happen, and for a moment Krebs' mother almost breaks through to issues like purpose and religious meaning: ". . . 'Do you want me to pray for you?' 'Yes.' So his mother prayed for him and then they stood up and Krebs kissed his mother and went out of the house. He had tried to keep his life from being complicated. Still, none of it had touched him. . . ." A few sentences later, the story concludes with the fact that nothing has happened: "Well, that was all over now, anyway. He would go over to the schoolyard and watch Helen play indoor baseball."

In Hemingway, boredom is the tension, the opposition, betwen the fact and the unstated. In Jackson, boredom contributes to the main point, setting the readers up for the shock at the end. In both conversational and expository forms, the ending is a conclusion to some kind of development. Because the development, the overall form, may at times be obvious, the reader may skip parts without missing anything essential. Readers make predictions and guesses based on their estimate of the form and world view, and if these predictions and guesses are clearly confirmed, then the reader can afford to skip now and then. When predictions and guesses are not confirmed, then the reader must reread or slow down. This is particularly true in archival or expository writing where the reader makes uncooperative tests of the relationships between evidence and conclusions. In Zero Degree writing, because the

overall point is not provided by the narrative, the reader must at all times check to see what general thesis or layer of significance is possible among the facts.

The problem of boredom also occurs when young readers are asked to read a selection from the Old Testament, which appears, in parts, to have an underlying report speech event. A selection from Genesis 22 discussed by Auerbach (1957) illustrates the problem. First, the selection has the traits of report writing. Second, all events are connected by and and, as such, have equal value or no value. The reader is expected to provide the main point. Many young readers believe that because the selection does not state a main point, and because the use of and suggests no priority in events, there must be no main point or priority. The problem here is that, while Hemingway stresses the fact as an escape from the intellectual reductionism of modern life, the Old Testament stresses the fact as the recognition of the presence of God and the divine in every part of the material world. In other words, the part or fact is all, in the same sense that Cassirer finds the fact as all in myth (Cassirer, 1946).

Cassirer's mythic style is similar to Auerbach's Biblical style. For Auerbach the central contrast is between the styles and world views of Homer, on the one hand, and the Bible, on the other hand. The first explains and illuminates all, like exposition, and the second leaves

background and causes unexplained, like reports:

> The two styles, in their opposition, represent basic types: on the one hand fully externalized description, uniform illumination, uninterrupted connection, free expression, all events in the foreground, displaying unmistakable meanings, few elements of historical development and of psychological perspective; on the other hand, certain parts brought into high relief, others left obscure, abruptness, suggestive influence of the unexpressed, "background" quality, multiplicity of meanings and the need for interpretation, universal-historical claims, development of the concept of the historically becoming and preoccupation with the problematic. (Auerbach, 1957:19)

The central contrast is between the conversational event and the events of formal lectures and exposition. In between is report writing, which has two kinds of focus on facts and exclusion of speculation, the facts like those of Hemingway in which the attention to fact is an escape from the reductionism of modern life and the facts like those of the Old Testament in which the attention to fact captures the essence of God who resides in all things. In both cases, readers must provide their own speculations and not expect the narrator to speculate for them. Readers who wait for speculations that never come and simply ask "What does it all mean?" will soon complain that the story is boring. At that point the reader should recognize the possibility either that boredom is a preparation for a reversal at the end or that boredom is, in fact, a facade over the tension between objective fact and an unstated hypothesis or background. Readers acquainted with the

assumptions of report speech events will recognize the conventions which are at work. In the Old Testament, Hemingway, and Jackson, there is a tension between the facts and an unstated, primary vision--meaninglessness in Hemingway, God in the Old Testament, and the concluding reversal in Jackson. Boredom results from doing nothing, and in these three stories readers get bored when they do not speculate, as they should in all report speech events, about the unstated, primary vision.

Accomodation: Modifying the Rules

Instances of assimilation (match the case to the public conventions) are hardly ever entirely separate from instances of accommodation (adjusting the public conventions to handle a new case). Some of the instances of assimilation previously discussed were, to some degree, also instances of accommodation. For instance, usually the report speech event only occurs with narratives focusing on events which appear historical and possible. But in "The Metamorphosis," the report form is applied to fantastic material. People do not change into cockroaches. Therefore, the reader must adjust the report form to what appears to be unusual material. The point is, of course, that the narrative is to be read as a report, not as a fairy tale or a fantasy.

The reading of The Stranger is another example. The Stranger is presented as a conversational speech event,

but unlike most conversational narrators the narrator of The Stranger specifically excludes approximations of meaning and purpose in events. The reader finds it very difficult to be cooperative and at the same time not talk about feelings, not fill in transitions and not engage in mutual evaluations and speculations. The narrator of The Stranger changes at the end of the book, but in the first part the narrator appears to be violating conversational rules. Reading The Stranger, therefore, is not the usual cooperative experience that readers have in conversations, and the experience of reading The Stranger requires the reader to add The Stranger to the set of speech events called conversations, but to place it near the boundary.

What happens when the reader must accommodate The Stranger to a set of conversational speech events is probably similar to what happens when a child must add penguin to the set called bird. The categories cohere around prototypes--robin for bird and "Why I Live at the P.O." for conversational speech events--and experiences like penguin and The Stranger are placed in the set near the boundary, penguin near the boundary between bird and fish and The Stranger near the boundary between conversational speech events and reports or Zero Degree writing.

Edgar Allen Poe's "The Masque of the Red Death" and "The Fall of the House of Usher" are two other examples of boundary cases which modify somewhat the possibilities of

particular speech events. Both are modifying the conversational speech event, but in a way quite different from the modification suggested by The Stranger. "The Masque of the Red Death," having an underlying conversational speech event, is expected to have a close relationship between the narrator and the implied reader, to have approximations of reality, not definitions, and to have a transitory, opaque text. "The Masque of the Red Death," while remaining a conversational form, has an I-you relationship in which the closeness is tempered by the formality of the narrator. The narrator does address the reader directly ("But first let me tell of the rooms"), but the formality suggests that the narrator is more like an accomplished storyteller relating directly to an audience than like one conversational partner relating to another ("In the meantime, it was folly to grieve, or to think. The prince provided all of the appliances of pleasure."). However, the storyteller does provide parenthetical expressions, even a slight hint of interaction with a partner's quizzical look ("And these--the dreams--writhed in and about"), and some loose ends which the reader can cooperatively fill in or leave ("It was toward the close of the fifth or sixth month. . . ." "There was much glare and glitter and piquancy and phantasm--much of what has been since seen in 'Hernani'"), all of which signal a conversational speech event.

"The Masque of the Red Death," unlike other conversational speech events, takes a definitional approach to reality throughout most of the story. The disease is described in detail as are the seven rooms and the clock. The clock, we are told, chimes every sixty minutes and every sixty minutes "embrace three thousand and six hundred seconds of the Time that flies." At the end the definitive quality of the description begins to fade away as the presence of the intruder is noted. Prince Prospero, we are told, "rushed hurriedly through the six chambers" to get to the seventh room and confront the intruder. We are told his immediate motivation: "the shame of his own momentary cowardice." The intruder confronts the Prince, and the next line says, "There was a sharp cry--and the dagger dropped. . . ." And when the crowd attempts to grab the intruder, they find "the grave-cerements and corpse-like mask which they handled with so violent a rudeness, untenanted by any tangible form." At the moment of the Prince's death, at the moment of describing the intruder, the definitional reality stops. All that is left is an approximation in the form of death personified: "And now was acknowledged the presence of the Red Death. He had come like a thief in the night."

"The Masque of the Red Death," again unlike prototypical conversational speech events, closes with a statement suggesting a permanent text like texts of expositions,

not the transitory texts of conversations: "And Darkness and Decay and the Red Death held illimitable dominion over all. The opening is much more transitory and non-detachable ("The 'Red Death' had long devastated the country"), as if the story were beginning in the middle of a conversation, unlike the opening of an exposition like The Mayor of Casterbridge ("One evening of late summer, before the nineteenth century had reached one-third of its span . . .").

The reasons for Poe's modification of the conversational speech event (or use of an existing modification) is that he wants to project a definitional attitude toward reality, one in which a rational man can know and predict truth, and then show the collapse of this definitional attitude in the face of life's uncertainties. The conversational form serves the important purpose of soliciting the reader's cooperation, asking the reader to fill in and supplement where necessary. Inexperienced readers who fail to see that cooperation rules are invoked sometimes ask Poe's narrator to give more details than are necessary: "Why didn't he tell us who the murderer was when the Prince died?"

"The Masque of the Red Death" adds to the set of conversational speech events an instance in which the narrator is an accomplished storyteller. These kinds of narrators produce stories which sometimes use a

definitional approach to reality and which begin as transitory texts non-detachable from settings and end as permanent texts which are detached from specific settings and can be placed in many different circumstances. Fog, darkness, cloudiness are the kinds of words that mark the uncertainty of reality in such stories.

"The Fall of the House of Usher" is another storyteller narrative but with a difference. This time the storyteller is an active participant in the story, not just an observer as was the case in "The Masque of the Red Death." Although participant, the narrator is not the main character. The I is repeated more often than in "The Masque of the Red Death" and the hints of turn-taking are more obvious and frequent: "There can be no doubt that the consciousness of the rapid increase of my superstition--for why should I not so term it?--served mainly to accelerate the increase itself." The "for why should I not so term it?" suggests that the narrator is responding to a reader's raised eyebrow or question about the word "superstition." One might argue that the narrator is asking his alterego the question, but even so the projected reader in such a case is the narrator's own alterego.

The approach to reality is very definitional, the narrator within the first three sentences using eight embedders and a long parallel construction in the middle of a sentence. The text itself is more transitory throughout,

projecting the impression of a document that is not intended for the permanent archives storing generalized knowledge. "The Masque of Red Death" does, however, at the end project permanency. Again the conversational form invites the reader to fill in and supplement. The world of "The Fall of the House of Usher," like the world of "The Masque of the Red Death," finally leaves gaps which are unfilled by the narrator. The narrator of "The Fall of the House of Usher" makes the uncertainty of events obvious from the beginning: "and at length found myself within view." How does one find oneself? The narrator, in other words, is not a clear, conscious agent who knows what is happening at all times. The conversational speech event seems an appropriate form for narrative outlining the limits of language and man's rational sensibilities.

The storyteller form, therefore, is a boundary case of conversational speech events. Another such case is the form of courtroom testimony. It allows for turn-taking, but the discourse is obviously pre-planned between attorney and client. The form is first-person, but the text is projected as possibly permanent, something to be saved for future use, and the approach to reality varies between approximations and definitions. An example of such a form is Defoe's Moll Flanders. A speech event analysis of Moll Flanders is consistent with Rader's (1974:259-260) view that "Defoe was not seen as a high literary artist until

the appearance of the fiction of Joyce and Wolfe." Says Rader, "Defoe is like Joyce and Wolfe in attempting to give a sense of the world as in actual fact it is given to us." In other words, Defoe's reputation increased when it became apparent to critics that authors of fiction may have organized their narrative around the way the "world is in actual fact . . . given to us." A speech event analysis is one way of studying fictional narrative in terms parallel to what one finds in the world.

Furthermore, speech event analysis helps clarify, I think, what Rader is suggesting when he says that Defoe's novels are "false true stories, pseudofactual rather than fictional" (1974:259). One test of a theory is whether it simplifies a problem rather than complicates it. Calling Moll Flanders a "false true story" and "pseudofictional" complicates the divisions between fiction and nonfiction, it seems to me. Speech event analysis offers, I think, a simpler explanation.

The crux of the problem is the "sharp critical quarrel about whether Defoe 'judges' or does not nudge his characters, ironically or otherwise." A fictional narrative, according to Rader, must signal the author behind the narrator, but in Defoe, "there is no such tacitly recognizable authorial control" (1974:259). He presents no judgments of his characters. Speech event analysis would suggest that in Moll Flanders there is authorial control, including a

projected, implicit judge. In conversational speech events, the form of courtroom testimony, one of the boundary cases, has the following distributionn of roles and characteristics:

Roles

Author	Narrator	Reader
Attorney	Client Witness	Cooperative Audience

World-at-large

Judge and Jury

Characteristics

Distancing	Processing	Text (Modeling)
A cooperative adding of world's judgment but keeping friendly attitude toward narrator	Approximations and Definitions	Parts are Permanent/ Marked for Archival Storage

Speech event analysis suggests that readers of Moll Flanders feel they must cooperate, as in conversational speech events, not themselves be judges as in exposition speech events. But the question then becomes what moral order the author establishes as background for the events. An attorney, preparing the testimony of the witness, recognizes that there exists in the world an implicit moral order against which the testimony of the witness will be judged. Moll Flanders establishes an implicit tension between her testimony and the moral order of Defoe's time.

Defoe knew that in everyday speech events courtroom testimony has an implicit dialogue with society's moral consensus. He, therefore, knew that the judge was always present in the courtroom and did not have to be explicitly outlined by him. Readers, in fact, like other spectators, estimate the judge's decision while playing the role of cooperative listeners.

In summary, misreadings can result when the readers either fail to follow (assimilation) or fail to modify (accommodation) the rules of speech events. One rule is that readers of report speech events must insert into the story speculations about the overall meaning of a list of facts. The exact nature of the speculation may vary. For instance, a list of facts in The Bible invites speculation about the presence of God in all things, but a list of facts in a Hemingway story invites speculation about the meaninglessness of modern life. The nature of the invitation is clarified in The Bible when God, in some way, steps into the story and makes his will known. In Hemingway, the point of meaninglessness is underlined by the fact that the story very often closes with an escape, an effort to get away from it all, or an absence of problem resolution. In Shirley Jackson's "The Lottery," all speculations are invited because the point of the story is the reversal at the end. In fact, the endless list of facts in "The Lottery" helps increase the shock at the end of the story.

Readers who fail to speculate about reports miss the point and often get bored.

Another rule of speech events is that readers of exposition must be critics of the story's generalizations. But a critic can accept a statement as partly true or accept the ambiguity of two contradictory statements both being true at some level. Inexperienced readers sometimes think that criticism means complete rejection of all views presented. They are unable to adjust to ambiguity and paradox. These readers will, as a result, misread a prototypical exposition like "Barn Burning." They will have difficulty with a boundary case report like "Metamorphosis." In "Metamorphosis," the narrator, using the prototypical conventions of report speech events, argues that the empirical fact of the event is all. The facts are that Gregor has a human point of view inside an insect's body. The reader, applying the rule of report speech events, speculates about the overall meaning of these facts, caught between defending Gregor's humanity against the indifference of the charwoman and others and rejecting Gregor because he is an insect. This latter view is presented by members of the family. The reader must be willing to accept the ambiguity of accepting both views.

Another rule of speech events is that readers are cooperative in conversations. But the degree of cooperation will vary, depending on the distance between the

reader and the narrator. The distance is extremely close in "Why I Live at the P.O." and very close in "The Garden Party." But the distance is only moderately close in Wuthering Heights. The reason for this moderate intimacy is that the reader is overhearing the conversation between Lockwood and his alterego in the diary. The cooperative reader is being directly addressed as in "Why I Live at the P.O." or "The Garden Party." Someone who overhears a conversation, standing in the conversational circle as a participant but not being directly addressed, is required to be only semi-cooperative. This degree of cooperation will directly influence the interpretation of the meaning of events. If the degree of cooperation is miscalculated, misreadings will result.

Sometimes readers fail to modify the rules of prototypical speech events so as to account for the rules in boundary cases. The Stranger, for instance, appears to be a prototypical conversation, but the narrator in the first part of the book keeps violating rules of conversation. The narrator will not allow any approximations about the overall meaning of events or about feelings between people. This exclusion of approximate generalities on subjects like love and cause-effect relationships in events is very much like what happens in reports. That is, Hemingway's narrator refuses to speculate. But Hemingway in "Soldier's Home" clearly establishes the speech event as a report.

Camus's The Stranger is a boundary case, a conversational speech event which appears to be a report in some ways. By the end of The Stranger, the narrator is speculating about everything, and the conversational conventions are in force without modification. The readers, therefore, must learn to make modifications for a boundary case and for a shift in the underlying speech event during the reading of the work. Poe's "The Masque of the Red Death" and "The Fall of the House of Usher" are two other boundary cases of conversations. They are conversations which include conventions of exposition in processing. Instead of approximate realities, these conversations project rational and logical ones. But by the end of both stories, approximate realities have been reinstated.

Moll Flanders is another example of a conversational boundary case. The Stranger has an overlap between conversations and reports, but Moll Flanders has an overlap between conversations and exposition. One of the rules of exposition is that the reader must play the role of critic and judge. In Moll Flanders, a text projected as the narrator's courtroom testimony, the reader, like any audience in a courtroom, recreates the mind of judge and jury. All courtroom spectators do this. In addition, the reader maintains a cooperative stance toward the witness, estimating the judge's decision of guilt or innocence on the one hand and excusing and filling in on the other.

V. CONCLUSION

This paper began with a concern about maintaining a compatibility between theories of composition and theories of literature, and a speech event theory was proposed as a way of using rhetorical considerations to illuminate problems of literary interpretation. But speech event theory does more than focus on the way composition and literary criticism share a common theoretical framework. Speech event theory also speaks to the much discussed question of whether or not the text has an objective, verifiable meaning. Crews has stated the problem as follows:

> Deconstructionism, I gather, holds that knowledge about literature is strictly unattainable. Perceptions of meaning cannot be made apart from the critic's expectations and world view, and so-called evidence for an interpretation is simply further speculation within a perceptual set. . . . We must therefore abandon the old fashioned quest to discover what a given author was trying to communicate. (Crews, 1979)

Speech event theory assumes that text or language is an effort on the part of the writer to communicate or express a meaning to a reader and that the writer has some chance of success because language, if it has any meaning at all, depends on writers and readers sharing, among other things, sets of rules about speech events. The basic rules of speech events are learned by people in their

everyday experiences with typical instances. But the reading of literature will require the reader to make some occassional modifications of the everyday prototypes.

One problem for young readers is that they often regard a written story as always a special case and do not apply their common sense understanding of speech events to the literary work. As a result the following problems can occur:

1. "Soldier's Home," a report speech event, is read as if it were a history, and as a result, the reader demands inappropriate generalizations from the author. In a report speech event, readers speculate to themselves. This speculation requires some factual background. Sometimes a report story must be read in the context of other stories by the same author on the same subject. Hemingway's "Big Two Hearted River" is an example of such a situation. Most newspaper reports on a continuing story are another such situation. Without the previous stories, the story on a given day will be somewhat incomplete.

2. The Stranger is presented by the author as if it were a conversational story, but the rules being followed at the beginning are those of reports. In this case, the author is violating speech event agreements in order to establish a tension between

the narrator and the reader. This tension is resolved at the end when conversational rules are reinstated.

3. The problems that readers have with Moll Flanders are an example of the problems that people have with boundary cases. Conversational speech events, although there are prototypical cases, come in many forms:

Conversational Speech Events

Monologue	Dialogue
Talking to oneself	"The Garden Party"
Diary	
Wuthering Heights	
Storyteller	**Courtroom Testimony**
"The Masque of the Red Death"	Moll Flanders

One problem in Moll Flanders is how much the reader should cooperate. Are courtroom spectators only semi-cooperative, as are readers of diaries? Says Booth (1961:322):

> . . . it is clear that Moll's point of view has given us difficulties that Defoe could not have intended; the very quality of our interest in the book depends on decisions which even now, more than two hundred years after the event, cannot be made with assurance.

The problem could be stated another way. Defoe, the author-attorney, put Moll Flanders on the stand, knowing full well that her testimony might be damaging to herself but hoping that even so she would be found innocent. The

readers who speculate about the imagined jury must finally decide what decision the jury will make about Moll's guilt or innocence. That is the way the testimony form works, and both the author and the reader share a common understanding of these rules. If Moll Flanders were written as a more prototypical conversation, Moll would be found only innocent, like Laura at the end of "The Garden Party." As it is, Moll is found innocent by the excusing reader and guilty by the reader's estimate of the judge.

An example of how the rule of the conversational speech event influences readers is Trollope's reaction to Barry Lyndon:

> . . . his story is so written that it is almost impossible not to entertain something of a friendly feeling toward him. . . . The reader is so carried away by his frankness and energy as almost to rejoice when he succeeds, and to grieve when he is brought to the ground. (Booth, 1961: 323)

Says Booth (1961:323), "It was not only Trollope who almost grieved; many readers were caught in the net of Barry Lyndon's rhetorical vitality. It baffled them to find themselves excusing his crime. . . ." What is influencing these readers are the rules of conversational speech events. These rules of conversations and other speech events are objectively verifiable rules of meaning. Without some agreements or rules on what words signal or mean, language cannot function as a means of communication between writer and reader. Yet it obviously does so

function. Speech event theory, then, attempts to take Hirsch's porject in the Aims of Interpretation (Hirsch, 1976) one step further and to review in sociolinguistic research the empirical evidence for some kind of stable meaning.

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